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The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into full effect in May 
2018 after a two-year transition period. The regulation aims to improve the data protection 
of the citizens of the European Union. The regulation also affects the rest of the world. 
Although not all the rules introduced by the GDPR are new, the regulation contains novel 
requirements both regarding data protection and information security level. One of these 
new requirements is the right of a natural person to be forgotten in certain circumstances.  
The novelty of the GDPR and in some parts the general wording of the rules contained in 
the regulation may create difficulties in interpretation for the entities that have to conform 
to the regulation’s rules. This thesis examines through the analysis of a medical applica-
tion, the impact of the regulation on data controllers and software developers dealing with 
data concerning health. The data protection and information security requirements pre-
sented by the GDPR are applied to the analysed application. The application is analysed 
against the requirements derived from the GDPR with the help of the Software product 
quality model of the ISO/IEC 25010 standard.  
Based on the conducted analysis, the application is in a good state regarding the GDPR 
even when some changes need to be implemented. At this stage, the impact of the GDPR 
on applications containing data concerning health is not significant if best practices were 
used to develop the application. The impact of the GDPR lies more in the general ap-
proach to managing risks directed at the software since the content and the amount of 
personal data should be considered in risk management. 
In addition to the analysis of a medical application, this thesis contains an analysis of the 
previously existing privacy legislations of the United States, Finland and France. The 
related privacy laws of these countries are compared to the GDPR so that the content and 
new additions of the new GDPR would be more apparent.  
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Euroopan yleinen tietosuoja-asetus (GDPR) tuli voimaan toukokuussa 2018 kahden vuo-
den siirtymäkauden jälkeen. Asetuksen päämääränä on parantaa Euroopan Unionin kan-
salaisten tietosuojaa yhdenmukaistamalla käytäntöjä ja vaikuttaa samalla myös muuhun 
maailmaan. Vaikka kaikki asetuksen esittelemät säännöt eivät ole uusia, niin esitys sisäl-
tää uudenlaisia vaatimuksia niin tietosuojan kuin tietoturvankin tason suhteen. Yksi näistä 
uusista vaatimuksista on luonnollisen henkilön oikeus tulla unohdetuksi tietyissä olosuh-
teissa. 
Tietosuoja-asetuksen uutuus ja paikoin yleisluontoinen esitystapa saattavat aiheuttaa tul-
kintavaikeuksia tahoille, jotka joutuvat muuttamaan toimintatapojaan asetuksen tulon 
myötä. Tämä diplomityö tutkii lääketieteellisen sovelluksen analyysin kautta sitä, miten 
asetus vaikuttaa terveyttä koskevia henkilötietoja käsitteleviin rekisterinpitäjiin ja ennen 
kaikkea sovelluskehittäjiin. Asetuksen tietosuojaan ja tietoturvaan liittyvät vaatimukset 
käsitellään analysoidun lääketieteellisen sovelluksen kautta. Sovellusta analysoidaan tie-
tosuoja-asetuksesta johdettuja vaatimuksia vastaan käyttäen ISO/IEC 25010 standardin 
ohjelmistotuotteen laatumallin toiminnallisen sopivuuden piirteiden avulla. 
Analyysin perusteella kyseinen sovellus on tietosuoja-asetuksen huomioon ottaen hy-
vässä tilassa, vaikka muutoksia tarvitseekin tehdä. Tässä vaiheessa tietosuoja-asetuksen 
vaikutus terveyttä koskevia henkilötietoja käsitteleviin sovelluksiin ei ole suuri, mikäli 
sovellusta kehitettäessä on käytetty parhaita käytäntöjä. Tietosuoja-asetuksen vaikutus 
tuntuu enemmän yleisessä lähestymistavassa ohjelmistoon kohdistuvien riskien hallin-
taan, sillä henkilötietojen sisältö ja määrä tulee ottaa huomioon riskinhallinnassa.  
Lääketieteellisen sovelluksen analyysin lisäksi työssä käsitellään jo olemassa olevia tie-
tosuojalakeja Yhdysvalloissa, Suomessa ja Ranskassa. Näiden maiden lainsäädäntöä ver-
rataan uuteen tietosuoja-asetukseen, jotta asetuksen sisältö ja lisäykset vertautuisivat lain-
säädäntöjen aikaisempaan tilaan.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Today there is a vast number of different services and devices that impact the lives of 
ordinary people. Information about individuals is gathered continuously through these 
services, like the one's Google and Facebook provide and used for numerous purposes, 
such as marketing [12]. The scope of information gathering creates several situations 
where there is a possibility of mishandling information and where privacy issues arise. 
Esteve [12] mentions lack of proper consent for information usage, user’s inadequate ac-
cess to their information and risk of anonymised data becoming personalised as privacy 
issues arising from the business practices of Google and Facebook. 
Botha et al. [4] note that today privacy and information security are essential to the digital 
economy. Incidents, where individuals' sensitive data is exposed, happen frequently. Bo-
tha et al. analysed data breaches made public in 2015 and 2016 and noted that some of 
the world’s largest data breaches happened during those years. Frequent occurrences of 
data breaches might lead to cynicism and a feeling of futility among individuals in what 
is described as "privacy fatigue" that Choi et al. [8] further studied. They implied that 
service providers and governments need to be aware of the effect of the users’ privacy 
fatigue since high privacy fatigue can cause people to become dissatisfied and reluctant 
to use online services such as social networks. Choi et al. [8] suggest that governments 
should discuss privacy issues from the consumers’ viewpoint and enact better policies 
since these policies can be a way of increasing privacy protection level. That, in turn, 
could increase people’s trust in privacy protections and make them more engaged with 
their privacy so that they would follow the best practices related to privacy and infor-
mation security. 
One policy that tries to consider the consumer’s perspective was formed in Europe over 
several years. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) aspires to improve data 
protection and is aimed to be as all-encompassing as possible. It has been under work for 
many years in the European Union (EU), and it has come to full effect in 25th of May of 
2018. The new regulation tries to unify the way user data is handled in the EU and to 
force companies from other locations to conform to these new requirements. The regula-
tion applies to all information handling in the EU and forces companies from other loca-
tions to conform to the regulation while working inside the EU handling Union citizens' 
data. The regulation gives new rights to individuals, such as the right to request erasure 
of personal data and enforces “data protection by design and data protection by default” 
principles. It also tries to ensure that information security is considered adequately during 
each step of personal data handling. [13] 
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The GDPR replaces the previous EU directive from 1995 titled 95/46/EC [13]. While 
directives are goal setting legislative acts that EU nations must achieve, each nation de-
vises their laws to reach the goal set by the directive [15]. Regulation, however, is binding 
and is applied outright replacing the corresponding member state law [15]. The regulation 
mentions that while objectives and principles of the previous directive are still relevant, 
the technological advances and other developments from the time when the previous di-
rective published have caused new challenges that demand a new regulation [13]. Not all 
details the GDPR presents are new, however, and have already been applied in member 
states like Finland and the previous EU directive. For example, the Finnish Personal Data 
Act already contains some specifications that are present in the regulation, such as an 
individual's right to be informed on what kind of information a registry keeper has stored 
of that individual in chapter 6, section 24 [19]. The regulation adds more specifications 
to the directive it replaces. 
The GDPR has been in a transitional period from May 2016, meaning that the member 
states and companies operating in the EU have had time to comply with the new require-
ments the regulation brings alongside it. However, the extent and impact of the regulation 
were not completely clear in the transitional period. This is because the regulation is am-
biguous in places. The GDPR is applied as is until a new member state law is prepared to 
add more precise measures to the GDPR. For example, in Finland, the new national law 
was not yet ready when the GDPR came into full effect. Missing national guidelines mean 
that some parts of the GDPR remain open to interpretation with no legal precedents and 
qualifications. The ambiguousness can provide a challenge for data controllers and pro-
cessors since it is not completely clear and specific how parts of the regulation affect 
them, what are the repercussions of failing to comply and is the current state of their 
information security policies and models up to date. 
One specific area of information handling is medicine and software systems containing 
patient information. In addition to personal data such as social security numbers, medical 
applications also contain information about the patient’s diagnosis and health. Even be-
fore the GDPR, the handling of such information was under strict regulation since patient 
information is deemed highly sensitive [22]. However, organisations handling patient 
data are also subject to the GDPR if they operate in the EU, so they must take the regula-
tion into account. Botha et al. [4] analysed data breach related statistics from Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse [38] and conclude that attackers have increasingly targeted the 
health industry in recent years and the health industry’s percentage in the overall amount 
of data breaches has increased. That is why the potential new improvements in the privacy 
regulation and the effect of the regulation should not be disregarded. Thus, the research 
questions are as follows: 
• How does the GDPR affect the software application and registry keepers handling 
health records? 
3 
 
 
• What do the GDPR’s information security rules mean for organisations handling 
health related personal data? 
These questions will be analysed with the help of an example medical software that is 
affected by the GDPR. Chapter 2 details the results of a literary analysis regarding previ-
ous studies related to the topic of this thesis. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 the relevant 
background for privacy and information security concepts is explained. The most relevant 
articles of the new GDPR are presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 describes the previously 
existing legislations of chosen example countries. In Chapter 7 the example medical soft-
ware is presented and analysed regarding the requirements derived from the GDPR. The 
software is analysed with the help of the Software Product Quality Model presented in 
ISO/IEC standard 25010 [46]. The required and possible changes for that application are 
also laid out. Chapter 8 contains discussion about the analysis and its limitations. Finally, 
Chapter 9 contains concluding remarks. 
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2. RELATED WORK 
The General Data Protection Regulation came to effect during the process of this thesis. 
Even though the details were decided in 2016, the two-year transitional period meant that 
the regulation was not enforced until 2018. As such, there has been a period where the 
GDPR could have been studied, and those studies could have had similar topics as this 
thesis.  
This chapter presents the findings of a related work search conducted on several separate 
occasions during the writing process of this thesis. The primary focus of the searches were 
scientific articles written about the GDPR concerning medicine or software applications 
in medicine. The searched publication databases were IEEE Xplore, ACM Digital Li-
brary, SpringerLink and ScienceDirect 
The details about the database searches are presented in Table 1. Many of the search terms 
overlapped with each other as many publications were present in several different 
searches. While the number of results of many used keywords indicates that the GDPR 
has been the topic of several studies or was mentioned, the number of relevant studies 
regarding this thesis and the aims of the related work search was meagre. Overall many 
studies did not go in depth with the regulation, mentioning it briefly or speculating on its 
impact. 
The GDPR was analysed from many viewpoints in the search results, with big data being 
one of the most analysed topics. The GDPR was included in several papers that analysed 
healthcare related laws from all over the world. There were also a few papers discussing 
privacy regulations and how the GDPR will affect data handled on a global scope. Espe-
cially genomic data was the focus of several studies. This focus is understandable since 
one of the most substantial single influence of the GDPR will be big data as colossal 
amounts of data from several sources are aggregated and analysed all over the world. 
While anonymised data is out of the GDPR’s scope, the regulation is still bound to affect 
swaths of data that is currently analysed. 
Of the studies that were among the search results, none were similar to the topic and scope 
of this thesis. The newness of the GDPR likely explains the result of the searches. A few 
studies discussed some related parts of this thesis. Flaumenhaft and Ben-Assuli [21] re-
viewed the legislations of several countries regarding personal health records and 
concluded that the international community has not been able to keep up with the devel-
opments of the “health information technology”. They see the GDPR as seemingly 
providing the most extensive protection measures but also mentioned that the regulation 
contains ambiguousness and room left for interpretation in key sections. Shu and Ja-
hankhani [40] analysed how the GDPR affects information governing of the National 
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Health Service (NHS) England primary care sector. The analysis is not exhaustive and 
stays on a general level. They discuss how the GDPR adds specifications and makes 
changes to previous conventions. An example of change is that the individuals are no 
longer required to pay for first subject access requests, which will increase operational 
costs of care organisations. 
Table 1. Publication database search results 
Search date Database Keywords and the number of 
results 
28.06.2018 ScienceDirect GDPR AND medicine, 54 re-
sults 
02.07.2018 IEEE Xplore GDPR AND medicine, 0 results 
GDPR AND health, 8 results 
08.08.2018 SpringerLink GDPR AND health, 132 results 
GDPR AND doctor, 37 results 
08.08.2018 ACM Digital Library GDPR AND medicine, 0 results 
GDPR AND health, 0 results 
GDPR AND wellness, 4 results 
GDPR AND doctor, 0 results 
GDPR AND hospital, 0 results 
17.08.2018 SpringerLink GDPR and medicine, 78 results 
GDPR AND hospital, 51 results 
17.08.2018 IEEE Xplore GDPR AND doctor, 1 result 
GDPR AND wellness, 0 results 
GDPR AND hospital, 1 result 
17.08.2018 ScienceDirect GDPR AND doctor, 37 results 
GDPR AND wellness, 390 re-
sults 
GDPR AND hospital, 63 results 
 
Lopes and Oliveira [28] surveyed the GDPR preparedness of Portuguese health clinics in 
their study, and among those that answered the survey, only 14 (25% of the surveyed) 
clinics responded that they had started or concluded their ratification of the measures. 
Tikkinen-Piri et al. [48] analysed the differences between the GDPR and the EU directive 
that preceded it. They developed 12 aspects for data-intensive companies to follow so that 
they would be able to successfully adopt the measures of the GDPR and follow these 
measures. The measures include reckoning with the sanctions and considering “data pro-
tection by design and data protection by default”. The detailed measures remain on a 
general level and do not focus on specific, concrete actions.  
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3. PRIVACY  
In this chapter, the relevant concepts of privacy are laid out. Further specification of these 
concepts is needed, as the GDPR does not provide concrete definitions for all the concepts 
it presents and because these concepts are not unequivocal. Privacy is one of the central 
themes of the regulation which means that understanding privacy and the various notions 
related to privacy is worthwhile. 
 Definitions of privacy 
Privacy can be defined differently depending on the viewpoint and context. The defini-
tions of privacy have also understandably developed as technology has advanced. The 
definition "right to be left alone" was popularised by Warren and Brandeis in 1890 [55]. 
They had observed that along with an older notion of physical privacy, intellectual and 
emotional life was also to be protected from unwanted publicity, from "injury of feelings" 
[55]. While this definition is too non-specific for this discussion, the idea of people want-
ing to protect private information about themselves is very relevant today. 
Another statement that relates to privacy comes from the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (2012/C 32/02). While the charter does not discuss privacy in 
exact terms, Article 7 contains the "Right to respect for private and family life" [14]. 
While a conclusion can be made that privacy is a fundamental right, the statement does 
not go into details explaining what privacy might mean in this context. Overall, privacy 
today is a multifaceted concept and as Spiekermann and Cranor [44] noted, people's data 
is fragmented into several places with difficult traceability whereas old definitions were 
made at a time when privacy violation would likely be limited to one person. Solove [41] 
also remarked that privacy is too complicated "to be boiled down to single essence". 
Solove [41] discusses risk management and how the balance of power in society affect 
people's privacy. He examines how a person can control what they reveal to others and 
what they consent in effectively controlling what information is available about them and 
what should remain in secret. The discussion Solove presents is a reasonable basis for this 
examination since the GDPR emphasises the individual’s right to control their infor-
mation. 
As can be seen, privacy is a complicated subject with many definitions and aspects. An-
other term related to privacy is data protection which is integrated into the name of the 
regulation. Hoffman et al. [23] note that while in the USA the term privacy is prevalent, 
that in Europe data protection is a more widely used term. Still, both of those terms are 
used to the same end which is to protect information from the public [23]. The point about 
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the regional difference in language seems very plausible considering that the GDPR 
mostly uses the term data protection.  
The GDPR does not define data protection either as was the case with privacy. A Dic-
tionary of Computer science defines data protection as a computer-related version of pri-
vacy and is defined alongside privacy [11]. Two concepts are introduced in the dictionary: 
protection of data about a specific individual or entity and protection of data owned by a 
specific individual or entity. Data protection legislation entry, on the other hand, discusses 
the individual's rights to find out what data has been stored of them and how legislation 
determines how different organisations can use the data they have collected [10]. Based 
on these definitions it seems that while privacy and data protection might be synonyms 
in some instances, data protection could be a more specific term. Privacy, as Solove [41] 
noted, has many facets. The fact that the GDPR incorporates the term data protection and 
because the Euro-centricity of the regulation, the term data protection might be more rel-
evant in this discussion. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union goes on after the “Right to 
respect for private and family life” to explain the protection of personal data in Article 8 
[14]. The article details how everyone has the right to the protection of personal data and 
how the processing must be based on a given consent or to some other legitimate reason. 
Personal data can be a multifaceted concept too. The GDPR defines personal data as any 
information related to an identifiable natural person where the person can be identified 
directly or indirectly [13]. The regulation singles out identifiers such as name, location 
data and health-related data. The GDPR's definition suggests that anything could be per-
sonal information in the right circumstances. Mai [30] concludes that personal data or 
personal information is a communicative act and that while controlling or restricting ac-
cess to said information is a means to protect it, the protection should not be limited to 
that. One should also think about the usage, analysis, and interpretation of personal data. 
Mai [30] also notes that the meaning of information ties closely to the context and situa-
tion.  Mai’s note is in line with the GDPR's notion that personal data is not an absolute 
term.  
Individuals create personal data of themselves directly through their actions. The creation 
of data is also a side product of the actions an individual makes, such as when they log 
into a service leaving a log file trace of their interaction. Data is also actively being 
recorded for different purposes and then saved into a storage place. Data can also only be 
monitored and not stored anywhere. Then when data is stored, a question arises about 
how and where it is stored, who has access to it and is it being distributed in some way to 
other stakeholders that in turn process the data to their ends. Concerns might also arise 
from the purposes of storing personal data. 
The GDPR leaves anonymous data out of its scope [13]. Pfitzmann and Hansen [37] de-
fine anonymity as when a subject is not identifiable within a set of subjects where the set 
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is defined as an anonymity set (the set of all possible subjects). Later they add an angle 
of an attacker into the definition, meaning that an attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish 
an individual from the anonymity set [37]. The GDPR is concerned only with the protec-
tion of personal data and through that consideration, only places requirements on data that 
could be identifiable. An anonymised dataset does not warrant special protection. The 
lack of protection for anonymised data leaves a potential gap since it does not seem rea-
sonable to think that data is automatically worthless or harmless without an identifiable 
factor in it. Complete anonymisation might not be entirely possible anymore and as Tav-
rov and Chertov [47] conclude in their study, even if identifying attributes are removed 
from a data set it is still possible using the right algorithms to violate the anonymity of 
groups in a data set.  
Although Tavrov and Chertov [47] discuss group anonymity, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that individual anonymity could also be violated in an anonymised dataset. It would 
also seem that the anonymisation depends on the method used to alter a data set. The 
problem could be that a data set that is supposed to be anonymised does contain infor-
mation that is linkable to an individual. However, because such information does not need 
to be protected under the GDPR, it might be out in the open without needed security 
measures. Anonymisation can also, therefore, be a way of trying to bypass the GDPR. By 
anonymising data, a controller can claim to have no data that falls under the effect of the 
GDPR, therefore, staying out of the scope of it. Then again anonymisation of data is an 
acceptable way of protecting individual's privacy when done right since it strips the data 
of all identifiable concepts. That is why the anonymisation of data is not automatically a 
poor way to increase the privacy protection level of the data. Those that anonymise the 
data need to be aware of the possible pitfalls anonymisation has. 
Anonymised data is altered in such a way that no person can be recognised based on that 
data. Pseudonymity on the other hand, as defined by the GDPR, has a crucial difference 
with anonymity, since the data is anonymous but additional information is stored sepa-
rately from it [13]. If the additional information is linked to the data, then it is once again 
possible to identify the individual through it [13]. The separately stored data must be 
stored securely so that the data does not become linkable to an individual. Pfitzmann and 
Hansen [37] present one definition of pseudonymity as the usage of pseudonyms as iden-
tifiers. Thus, pseudonymity can be a weaker state of anonymity. 
Pfitzmann and Hansen [37] define linkability as the ability of an attacker to sufficiently 
distinguish if two or more items of interest are related to each other or not. The GDPR 
itself does not define linkability. Linkability relates to pseudonymity and personal data in 
general since pseudonymised data is not pseudonymised if the additional information is 
linked back to the data set where it was removed. The problem with linkability is that 
linking the data to other datasets might not be apparent. Sometimes datasets that seem 
harmless by themselves are suddenly categorised as personal data when linked together. 
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 Privacy by Design 
The article 25 of the GDPR presents the requirement for “data protection by design and 
data protection by default” [13].  For data protection by design, the regulation states that 
while considering the nature of the data processing, the controller should implement ap-
propriate technical and organisational measures that in turn implement data-protection 
principles [13]. Also, necessary safeguards need to be integrated into the processing to 
meet the requirements of the GDPR and protect data subjects’ rights [13]. Pseudonymisa-
tion is mentioned as a measure and data minimisation as a data-protection principle. Data 
protection by default ensures that only personal data that is necessary for specific pro-
cessing is processed and it applies to collecting, processing and storing data [13]. Acces-
sibility is also mentioned, and data protection by default must ensure that an individual’s 
data is not accessed by anyone who does not have the right to access it. The GDPR does 
not go more into specifics of what “data protection by design or data protection by de-
fault” are, but they seem to be central in the regulation.  
“Data protection by design and data protection by default” seem to be related to Privacy 
by Design (PbD) concept. PbD’s goal is to embed privacy to technical specifications from 
the start and not to add it during or after development [6]. Initially, its primary area of 
application was information technology, but it has since expanded to other areas too. It is 
meant to be a technology independent framework that tries to maximise the ability to 
integrate good information practices to the designs and specifications. [6] The main prin-
ciples of PbD are: 
1. Proactive not reactive; Presentative not remedial 
2. Privacy as the default 
3. Privacy embedded into design 
4. Functionality – Positive-sum, not zero-sum 
5. End-to-end lifecycle protection 
6. Visibility and transparency 
7. Respect for users’ privacy [6] 
In the following sub-chapters, the main principles are detailed, and their meanings ana-
lysed. PbD’s principles and demands are not perfect, so it is also helpful to analyse coun-
ter arguments made against these principles. 
 Proactive not reactive; Presentative not remedial 
The first principle of PbD suggests that actions related to privacy should anticipate and 
prevents events that may violate privacy before these events happen. With PbD, the ob-
jective is not to wait for a risk to materialise, but instead try to prevent the risk from 
materialising as well as it is possible. Cavoukian et al. mention as an example of this the 
ability of individuals to review what information has been stored about them. [6]  
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Bier et al. [2] note that the principle is easy to understand but hard to apply from the 
developer’s standpoint. It is challenging to predict the future, and it might be impossible 
to build appropriate proactive measures against an issue. As an example of this Bier et al. 
[2] mention advances in cryptanalysis and how today’s best algorithms might be obsolete 
in the future. Then again PbD only aims for proactivity and not necessarily to a state 
where every single possible issue could be known beforehand and then prevented, so the 
principle is not inherently flawed. The example of encryption algorithms becoming ob-
solete as time goes on is good, but the principle’s aim might be more that the system 
should not be designed so that only one or two fixed algorithms can be used. Instead, for 
example, the system should be designed for relatively easy switching of the base algo-
rithm. 
 Privacy as the default 
The second principle explains the notion of the default state in and of itself. Cavoukian et 
al. [6] argue that personal data of individuals should automatically be protected so that no 
extra action is required from the individual. The reason given is that the users of a system 
should not need extra effort for their privacy to remain intact.  
The second principle too is understandable but has real-world effects that can be compli-
cating. Bier et al. [2] mention that every subsystem or functionality must be so designed 
that PbD’s principles are accounted for. Not only the core functionality should comply 
with the PbD. This means that new functionality cannot be directly added to a system, but 
its effects on the principles of the PbD should be analysed also. 
 Privacy embedded into design 
The next principle relates to the previous one through the embedding of privacy into the 
design. Privacy is then the default state at least in theory. As privacy is in the design, it is 
not added or bandaged into the system afterwards. Privacy then becomes an integral fea-
ture of the system much any other specified functionality would be. [6] Bier et al. [2] 
question the principle’s idea that privacy would not diminish functionality since often the 
idea of functionality comes before privacy.  
While privacy can be integral to the system, it can complicate or prevent specific func-
tionality. Then again if privacy is thought upon when the functionality is designed, it 
would less likely cause trouble further on. Whether a functionality that is inherently in-
compatible with privacy is a good idea is another topic in its entirety, but considering 
PbD’s philosophy, such functionality should not be included into a system. An example 
of functionality that is incompatible with privacy is collecting and publicly sharing track-
ing data from a smart watch, like the case when it was found out that Polar’s Explore 
global activity map could be used to track specific individuals and even discover secret 
locations [27].  
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 Functionality – Positive-sum, not zero-sum 
PbD's objective is a win-win situation where the arguments of privacy versus availability, 
a zero-sum approach, would be left behind. Integrating privacy into a system would ben-
efit all and developers would not have to cut corners further along the development re-
garding privacy. Cavoukian et al. use an example from healthcare where a patient should 
not have to choose between the functionality of service and privacy. [6]  
Bier et al. [2] note that in the real world there usually are such trade-offs. They point out 
how this zero-sum approach is not always possible, even though PbD suggests that pri-
vacy and functionality should always increase hand in hand and another’s growth should 
not diminish another.  
PbD’s aim to end the functionality versus privacy debate might not be ultimately 
achieved, but it is still essential to try and minimise the trade-off by taking privacy issues 
into account early in the development cycle. As with the Polar’s case, there sometimes 
seems to be a trade-off between an individual’s privacy and them wanting to adopt some 
new technology into their lives. In Polar’s case the ability to track and share the routes 
the users of the application had gone through, that data could be used freely by everyone 
else too, possibly to nefarious ends. So, the users must choose between the possible and 
perceived benefits of a technological service and their privacy thereby making it a zero-
sum game. Choi et al. [8] analysed privacy fatigue and mentioned how a high level of 
privacy fatigue could prevent people from using certain services. In that way, the zero-
sum game may prevent new technologies from being adopted more widely if their privacy 
related attributes are not up to standards. It seems that it would be in the long run benefi-
cial for the companies to integrate privacy into their services and applications, which is 
what PbD tries to achieve. 
 End-to-end lifecycle protection 
Through the fifth principle, PbD tries to ensure that personal data is appropriately handled 
throughout its lifecycle, from the collecting to the destroying. Cavoukian et al. also men-
tion proper log data files increase flexibility in implementation. [6]  
Ensuring privacy depends on adequate information security mechanisms and these must 
go hand in hand [2]. Bier et al. [2] also note that measuring complex systems concerning 
their security is difficult since, in addition to useful information security mechanisms, 
protocol implementation and attacker models also need to be considered. Also, a human 
factor comes into play as roles and responsibilities need to be assigned to people [2]. It 
does seem that there are several challenges to end-to-end lifecycle protection that are 
difficult for one entity to control and think of beforehand. While technical solutions are 
relatively easy to measure, aspects like the human users of the software systems can be 
difficult to predict. 
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 Visibility and transparency 
The sixth principle seeks to increase transparency so that every stakeholder would know 
what is goes on with their personal data. It also helps individuals to find out if their data 
is handled as it should and that the organisations are following the rules. User confidence 
will likely rise because of transparency. As a healthcare example, a patient should be able 
to know what information is collected, how the information is used and who can access 
the information. [6]  
According to Bier et al. [2] audits, notifications and information are means to achieve the 
goals of this principle. They also mention potential conflicts between privacy require-
ments, like with transparency and unlinkability. Different privacy requirements do not 
always exist without conflicts with each other. 
 Respect for users’ privacy 
The last principle is straightforward and more of a reminder of PbD’s goal. The respect 
for privacy should be an essential interest to software handlers [6]. The other six princi-
ples are more standalone requirements whereas this principle is an overarching conven-
tion.  
Privacy features should be easy to use and user-centric for them to work properly [2]. 
Data minimisation should be the goal since the user should retain their information self-
determination. On the other hand, as Bier et al. [2] point out complete data voidance 
where no data is stored as a default and it is an unchangeable setting, robs the user from 
their self-determination. Therefore, a middle road approach should be found, and Bier et 
al. [2] present data minimisation as the middle road. 
 Privacy by Design criticism 
PbD’s definition provides valuable information since the GDPR’s definitions of the “data 
protection by design and data protection by default” do not go into specifics apart from 
mentioning pseudonymity and data minimisation. From a legal standpoint this is under-
standable as the GDPR tries to be technology independent and applicable and as Tsorm-
patzoudi et al. [49] note, the way the GDPR is worded is flexible because of necessity so 
that concrete measures can be accommodated for specific cases. Tsormpatzoudi et al. [49] 
call the GDPR’s two concepts more comprehensive than PbD’s. Even though PbD is not 
included in the GDPR word to word, it is still the basis of the regulation’s notion of “data 
protection by design and data protection by default”.  
PbD is not without issues as can be seen from the counterexamples Bier et al. [2] present 
to each principle criticising the consistency of PbD as was discussed when the principles 
were analysed. Tsormpatzoudi et al. [49] and Koops and Leenes [25] on the other hand 
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discuss challenges that PbD’s implementation into the legislative measures will bring. 
While both articles were written when the GDPR was only a draft version, the core of 
their criticisms is still relevant today as the GDPR has been in effect for relatively little 
time with not much time for legal precedents yet. Tsormpatzoudi et al. [49] discuss chal-
lenges arising from the wording in the GDPR, legal compliance in implementation, diffi-
culties of understanding between principles and the role of the data protection officer. As 
a further future challenge, they introduce the involvement of stakeholders that are not 
from the organisations of the data processors that implement the measures introduced in 
the GDPR and how those stakeholders may also need to be educated about PbD or 
GDPR’s privacy by design and by default [49].  
Koops and Leenes [25] argue that PbD should not be interpreted so that technologies or 
coding is the only acceptable solution for complying with the regulation. Instead, com-
munication strategies should be thought of, and mindsets of the designers and developers 
influenced [25]. They argue that techno-oriented implementation holds too many prob-
lems in it such as contradictions with the rest of the regulation and the difficulty of defin-
ing the scope of data protection requirements [25]. System developers should not try to 
integrate as many data protection measures as they can, but instead, organisational 
measures would be more fitting [25]. The GDPR has included minimisation in the final 
version of the regulation, so Koops’ and Leenes’ aims came at least partially true. Their 
argument about the interpretation of PbD is reasonable since usually there are not any 
universal technical solutions that could guarantee compliance. Fortunately, the GDPR’s 
final version tries to be technology neutral and emphasises appropriate solutions and 
measures depending on the situation. Koops and Leenes do not entirely rule out technol-
ogy related solutions, but they want to emphasise that technological solutions are not the 
only way of complying with the regulation. 
It seems that the openness of the GDPR and in part PbD has two consequences. On the 
other hand, it ensures that the regulation is not too specific so that it does not rule out 
legal cases where the regulation should be applicable. However, on the other hand, it may 
confuse those that need to follow the regulation and make adhering to the regulation un-
necessarily tricky and defeating the aim and purpose of the regulation. As Liebwald [26] 
discusses, legal language has specific challenges that it needs to deal with. These chal-
lenges are the need to build general norms using abstract language and the distance that 
exists between the general ruling and a legal decision taken in an individual legal case. 
As language itself is imprecise, there can never exist a maximum precision in the 
legislative text [26]. Also, there is an added vagueness in legal text that sometimes the 
courts must interpret and possibly substitute for the legislator [26]. Liebwald lists several 
reasons why vagueness might be added into legislation: covering future circumstances 
that are not entirely predictable, covering the typical cases, leaving room for more specific 
rules and interpretation, or that genuine political willingness or consent are lacking.  
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Vagueness in law can be considered a good thing since it moves influence from the leg-
islator to the courts. Legislators can be perceived to be fickle and more affected by con-
cepts such as party politics. Also, it can be perceived that there is no reason to question 
the independence of a judge. Still, if there exists too much vagueness in the legal system, 
the separation of power between different government entities might become blurred, and 
the laws lose their verifiability and predictability. [26]  
In the GDPR’s case, many of the reasons for vagueness presented by Liebwald [26] seem 
to apply. As a Union regulation, it tries to leave room for the national more specific laws 
while trying to consider the technological advancement of the future. The more specific 
ways of complying with the regulation in different circumstances might be better decided 
in national courts with the GDPR being framework in which the decision is made.  
It is not an easy task to implement something like PbD into widely used legislation, and 
careful thought must be put into how it works in practice as PbD, too, can cause un-
intended damaging consequences if worded wrongly. Then again, such a paradigm shift 
in the way that applications and system are designed and how people’s personal data is 
used is bound to cause issues. An appropriate question would be that is individual’s per-
sonal information so invaluable, that inconveniences to the developers and designers 
weigh more heavily? Of course, real-world issues and facts demand that concept solutions 
need to be thought upon and modified when adopting concepts such as PbD into laws. 
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4. INFORMATION SECURITY 
Security is a term that people use in several ways in everyday language. It relates to a 
multitude of concepts, and one of them is information. Information security along with 
data protection is at the heart of the GDPR, so information security and the related con-
cepts are analysed in this chapter. 
 A definition of information security 
The GDPR defines network and information security as "the ability of a network or an 
information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or unlawful 
or malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and confi-
dentiality of stored or transmitted personal data" [13]. Three of the concepts mentioned 
in the GDPR, confidentiality, integrity, and availability form a so-called CIA definition 
that is argued to be the most used information security definition in the literature [29]. 
Figure 1. shows the relationships between confidentiality, integrity and availability and 
how these three concepts form security.  
Confidentiality tries to make sure that only those with the proper rights and privileges 
have access to protected data [36, p. 10][46]. Access includes but is not limited to view-
ing, reading and knowing [36, p.10]. Confidentiality is then breached when someone who 
is not allowed to can access the information. An example of a confidentiality breach is 
when some malicious individual infiltrates a computer system and steals sensitive data 
from it.  
Information has integrity when an authorised party can only access or modify an asset in 
authorised ways [46]. The modification includes writing, changing (status), deleting and 
creating data [36, p. 10]. Integrity as a protective measure is not only limited to preventing 
unauthorised modifications by a user but also concerns itself with situations where data 
changes due to an error or a failure. Database corruption and information loss while it is 
transmitted from a location to another are also examples of integrity issues. 
Availability means that authorised users can access information without interference and 
receive it as it was supposed to be received [36, p. 10]. The prevention of access should 
not occur in case of legitimate access. Pfleeger and Pfleeger [36, p. 12] list characteristics 
of available information as the timely response to a request, the requesters are equal, the 
system is fault tolerant so that information is not lost in case of a failure, the system can 
be used as it was intended, and that concurrency is controlled.  The ISO/IEC 25010 stand-
ard’s [46] Software product quality model does not place availability into security char-
acteristics but to reliability characteristics. Nevertheless, the definition in the standard for 
availability is like Pfleeger and Pfleeger’s definition.  
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Sometimes more properties are added to the three laid out ones of the CIA definition [29], 
as the GDPR does by including authenticity [13].  ISO/IEC 25010 Software product qual-
ity model also includes authenticity, as well as non-repudiation and accountability to 
measured security sub-characteristics [46]. Authenticity can be defined as the process 
where a user’s identity is verified to be the one that is claimed before they are granted 
access to services [46]. A general example of enforcing authenticity is asking a user to 
input their password before letting them log on to a service. 
 
Figure 1.  Relationships of CIA concepts [36, p. 11] 
  
Authenticity adds to the CIA definition a very concrete measure of ascertaining that the 
entity accessing a piece of information is whom they say they are. As confirming a data 
17 
 
 
subject’s identity is one of the GDPR’s requirements, it is no wonder that authenticity is 
included in the wording of the regulation. Accountability and non-repudiation share sim-
ilar goals, as non-repudiation is defined as the ability to prove that an event has taken 
place without the possibility to repudiate it later and accountability is defined as ensuring 
that entity’s actions can be traced uniquely to the entity [46]. 
The exact definitions of CIA concepts may differ based on the source [29]. Lundgren and 
Möller present that the CIA definition is itself too narrow and while the definition is a 
fitting way to analyse security, information security should not be defined through the 
CIA definition. Sometimes the three concepts also contradict each other [29][36, p. 10]. 
It seems that the definition of information security, like the definition of privacy, is hard 
to pin down. The GDPR itself does use a variant of the CIA definition, so it is an appro-
priate definition to use here with added attributes. The popularity of the CIA definition is 
also its merit. 
 Data at rest, in motion and in use 
Data that is protected can be in an inactive state in a file system, transmitted from one 
place to another or currently in use in some context. Respectively the terms data at rest, 
in motion and in use are used to describe these states. That is why different protection 
measures need to be applied so that the data’s confidentiality, integrity and availability, 
among other properties, is guaranteed. While data is in motion or a transmission state, 
confidentiality means that an unauthorised person cannot read the data. Integrity means 
in this case that data cannot be modified or falsified by an unauthorised user [54, p. 2]. 
Availability then means that the transmitted data is available to those that are authorised, 
and they receive it as it should be. Authenticity is used to define that legitimate access.  
While data is at rest or in a storage state confidentiality means that no authorised user can 
access it through network and integrity means that the data stored cannot be modified or 
falsified by an unauthorised user through a network [54, p. 2]. Physically accessing the 
stored data could also be added here even though someone physically accessing the space 
the storage device is in is likely lower than accessing the data through a network from 
anywhere in the world. Availability and authenticity mean virtually the same here as in 
motion.  
Data in use state is defined as data that is in device memory, so the data has been recently 
or is currently manipulated [45]. While the data is usually loaded to memory through 
legitimate actions, protections should be still placed so that CIA and authenticity are held 
for data in memory too. As an example of the need to protect data in use, Stirparo et al. 
[45] analysed data in use leakages in the memory of Android smartphones, and they found 
that many applications leave sensitive data into the device memory and do not appropri-
ately protect it. The result shows that along with protecting data in motion and at rest, 
attention should also be paid to secure data in the memory of the devices. 
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As can be seen, the CIA definition’s attributes can theoretically be guaranteed similarly 
even though the data is in a different state. The exact measures of doing so change and 
several solutions for this have been developed over the years. For data at rest, the primary 
method used is encryption, especially when thinking about the potential theft of the device 
where the data is located [1, p. 75]. Physical security also relates to data at rest, so making 
it difficult to physically access the areas, where the data storage devices are, is essential. 
[1, p. 76]  
For data in motion, there is a need to protect the data itself and the connection through 
which the data travels. For the data itself, there exist several secure versions of transmit-
ting protocols, like SSL/TLS (Secure Socket Layer/Transport-Level Security) which can 
be used appropriately to ensure that the data is transmitted securely. As for the connection, 
a virtual private network (VPN) connection can be constructed so that the whole network 
traffic is encrypted. [1, p. 77]  
As for the data in use part, the measures are more limited since the data is accessed by 
those who have legitimate access to it. [1, p. 78] Buffer overflows are a typical example 
of trying to exploit data that is stored in memory. In a buffer overflow, the software ac-
cesses a part of memory that otherwise not reserved for it. Buffer overflow is achieved 
by using an array reference to read or write to a location before or after the array. Through 
the buffer overflow, sensitive data such as old passwords left in memory after processing 
could be accessed, violating confidentiality. Integrity and availability can also be violated 
if data is corrupted or changed. These overflows can be prevented several measures, in-
cluding programming language choices and verifying that accesses are within bounds in 
the program code. [3]   
Access control is needed to help ensure the confidentiality, integrity, availability and au-
thenticity. In information security, access control is a fundamental part of ensuring that 
objects are only accessed by those who should have access to them [36, p. 109]. Even 
though access control is fundamental, it is hard to implement correctly and extensively. 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [34] mention broken access con-
trol in their 2017 Top 10 Application Security Risks listing as one of the most common 
risks applications face. The GDPR does not explicitly mention access control, but it is 
safe to say that it is an integral part of a software system especially since the risks of 
exploiting a poor implementation are high. Related to access control is the concept of 
least privilege. As defined by Saltzer and Schroeder [39], every user, as well as a program, 
should only have the least amount of privileges to complete a task. Having a few privi-
leges limits the potential damage caused due to an error, accident or a deliberate attempt 
to misuse a system.  
As the processor of the data needs to be able to prove that they are complying with the 
GDPR and that they have acted with the compliance of the regulation, it is useful to doc-
ument activities in a software system. Log keeping and the audit trail can help with that 
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and logging is mentioned as a responsibility of those entities that process or control the 
data [13]. An action that has an impact on security can be minor like an individual ac-
cessing a file or major, like a change in an access control change affecting the whole 
database [36, p. 272]. Accountability of actions is enforced by logging these security-
related events into a log that lists the event and who caused the event. This logging pro-
cedure forms an audit log which must be kept secure from unauthorised access. [36, p. 
272] 
The problem of audit logs is that they can grow too large if every instance of every event 
is logged. In addition to the issue of volume, the analysis of the log would become too 
cumbersome if the log is too big. That is why the events that require logging should be 
carefully decided. [36, p. 272] Regulatory measures, for example, can dictate what should 
be stored and what not. Audit log and can also be reduced, so that the log itself contains 
only the major events and more insignificant logging data is stored elsewhere [36, p. 273]. 
 Risk analysis 
No software can be completely secure. Attempting to combat every single possible threat 
whether it is an error, fault or adversary would be too resource consuming to try. That is 
why different threats and possibilities need to be assessed somehow and then try to protect 
the software from these perceived threats that are relevant.  
Although there are several different definitions for risk, an information security-oriented 
definition is suitable in this case. Wheeler [56, p. 23] defines risk from an information 
security standpoint as “the probable frequency and probable magnitude of future loss of 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, or accountability”. A risk has both the probability 
of it materialising and the effect that it causes when it materialises. The goal of risk man-
agement is to maximise the organisation’s effectiveness while at the same time minimis-
ing the chance of adverse outcomes or incidents [56, p. 24]. The goal is not to erase every 
risk, but to prioritise the most important ones systematically so that the critical risks will 
not go unnoticed.  
The general workflow of risk management is shown in Figure 2. Risk analysis and man-
agement is a cyclical process, and well-established risk management frameworks use this 
type of lifecycle approach [56, p. 46]. The risk assessment stage of this workflow contains 
risk analysis where the risk is measured by its likelihood and severity [56, p. 47]. As can 
be seen from Figure 2, several different people and roles take part in the process. Also, 
the responsibilities should be shared since the security function is merely helping and 
guiding, while the business owner is the one who owns the risk [56, p. 47]. 
The risks that were identified and analysed in step 2 will be evaluated in step 3, where the 
newly analysed risks are also compared against possible previous ones to form prioritisa-
tion between them [56, p. 47]. The decisions should be documented as seen in step 4. In 
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step 5 the mitigations measures are decided. Not all risks can be eliminated, so sometimes 
exceptions must be made [56, p. 47].  
After mitigation, the developed measures must be validated against the real world to en-
sure that the reduction in risk is achieved [56, p. 47]. Sometimes the theoretically sound 
mitigation means do not work when they are implemented or end up increasing another 
risk while mitigating another. Wheeler [56, p. 48] presents an example of this problem 
where the increase of logging level on servers to provide more accurate information about 
potential unauthorised activity might start to consume too many resources and slow down 
the system.   
The last stage is the monitoring and audit stage the resources and risks related to it are 
monitored. If there are any significant changes regarding the risks or an agreed amount 
of time has passed the risk management process is started again from the profiling stage. 
After the monitoring and audit stage, the next cycle of risk management can begin when 
needed. [56, p. 48] This process is continuous since new risks present themselves, and the 
magnitudes of old risks can increase or decrease as time goes on.  
 
Figure 2.  Information security risk management workflow [56, p. 46] 
The GDPR discusses risk in several articles and sections. In general, the regulation’s ap-
proach is risk-based where the suitability of different data protection and information se-
curity measures are depended on the perceived risk. The likelihood and severity of risks 
for the rights and freedoms of natural persons need to be considered, and the evaluation 
process should be updated and reviewed when necessary [13]. As such, the GDPR talks 
about risks and risk-assessment process similarly to previously existing literature. The 
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GDPR mentions situations where the risk can be almost automatically considered to be 
high, such as when the processing is done on a large scale where many natural persons 
would be affected or when the data concerns children [13]. 
The regulation also discusses data protection impact assessments, that controller shall 
carry out before processing the data if the risk for the rights and freedoms of natural per-
sons is considered high. The controller can ask assistance for this from a supervisory 
authority. In short, the impact assessment should contain why, what and how information 
is processed, what is the result of risk assessment and what are the risk mitigation means 
that will be applied to lessen the impact of the risks. [13] As such, the data protection 
impact assessment seems to be a broadened risk-assessment where the controller needs 
to specify and think about why they process pieces of specific information. Since risk 
management is and should be a part of organisations way of operating, the GDPR does 
not add large amounts of new required tasks for the controller. It is clear that the makers 
of the GDPR want the controllers and processors to stop and think about why they are 
processing data and how the data is used. The need for data minimisation presents itself 
clearly when the controller cannot adequately explain why a data point is needed and the 
individual’s risk of some specific data about them being misused or unnecessarily pro-
cessed is mitigated. 
The theme of risk is indeed a central topic in the regulation, as it also is in the information 
security space. The regulation passes the burden of defining the appropriate measures to 
the data processors and defines the framework on how that definition should be done. The 
GDPR attempts to pressure data processors to get their risk assessment routines in order. 
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5. GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 
In this chapter, the focus points of the General Data Protection Regulation are laid out. 
The European General Data Protection Regulation was finalised in May 2016 and the 
transition period ended on May 25th in 2018. The basic principles of the regulation are 
laid out in article 5 of the regulation as lawfulness, fairness and transparency, purpose 
limitation, data minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, integrity and confidentiality 
and accountability. Several key terms are introduced in the regulation. The most relevant 
of these concerning this thesis are: 
• data subject: A natural person 
• processing: Any operation that is performed on personal data 
• data controller: natural or a legal person, public authority or other instance that 
alone or with others specifies the reasons and means of processing personal data 
• data processor: An instance that on behalf of the data controller, processes the 
personal data [13] 
A risk-based manner of approach has been adopted for assessing if the implemented se-
curity measures are enough regarding the nature or the amount of the data being stored 
and processed [13]. Through a risk analysis a data controller can find out the appropriate 
technical and organisational requirements needed in that specific case. Not all security 
measures apply in every situation which is valid for information security in general. The 
data controller is also responsible for informing their supervisory authority of a data 
breach without undue delay and possibly also the data subjects that were affected by the 
breach. The data controller has a reverse proving requirement: the controller needs to be 
able to document and, when needed, present how they handle the information they pro-
cess. [13]   
The GDPR defines two distinct ways of information gathering from individuals. Either 
the gathering is legislation based which means the controller and processor has a require-
ment in a member state law or union law to gather information about individuals or the 
gathering is based on a consent asked from the data subject. The consent must be gained 
through activity by the data subject, so the subject must opt-in rather than opt-out for the 
processing of their information. Silence or inactivity are therefore not acceptable means 
of getting the consent form a data subject. The data subject has a right to withdraw the 
given consent. The data subject has also gained several rights that they can exercise. In 
general, these rights must not conflict with the rights of other data subjects or with other 
member state laws. [13] 
While the regulation overrides the previous EU directive and in turn the national laws that 
have been based on that directive, it is not all-encompassing. As member states have had 
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their laws considering for example patient data, the GDPR leaves room for further limi-
tations [13]. These limitations must not prevent the free flow of data where applicable, 
but data concerning health is an area where member state law or future union laws can 
introduce further restrictions [13]. The possibility of member states to further specify and 
expand the basis which the GDPR has created means that while the regulation may, in the 
beginning, overwrite some previous national laws, the member states can bring their pre-
vious regulatory measures back if they do not conflict with the GDPR. 
Although the GDPR is an EU regulation, the scope of the regulation has been broadened 
to all controllers and processors even if they are not established in the EU if the processing 
activities relate to offering goods or services to data subjects inside the EU. The same 
applies to monitoring the behaviour of data subjects when that behaviour takes place in-
side the EU. [13] That way the regulation affects large parts of the world and has several 
implications for business practices even for companies based outside of the European 
Union. In addition to service providing activities, the companies that analyse data that has 
come from EU citizens are also subject to the GDPR. 
The regulation defines supervisory authority as an independent public authority estab-
lished by a member state. There also exists a concept of the supervisory authority con-
cerned, meaning the authority which is concerned by specific processing of personal data 
because the controller or processor is established on the territory of that authority, data 
subjects in that territory are substantially affected by the processing, or a complaint has 
been lodged with the authority. In the regulation, Article 51 details the specifics of the 
supervisory authority. Each member state should have at least one supervisory authority 
to monitor the application of the GDPR. [13] 
The GDPR details several kinds of consequences of not following the regulation. Every 
data subject has the right to lodge a complaint to a supervisory authority and even to take 
judicial measures against that authority if they do not handle their complaint in due time. 
Same applies to the controller or the processor. Data subjects can also receive compensa-
tion from the controller or the processor if they have suffered material or non-material 
damages as the results of an infringement of the GDPR. [13]  
Also, the supervisory authorities can impose administrative fines on data controllers or 
processors. The regulation lists several factors that the authority should consider before 
deciding on the fine, such as the nature of the infringement or the actions taken by the 
controller or processor to mitigate damages. As to the size of the fines, the regulation 
mentions three categories of fine sizes. The choice between them depends on which arti-
cle of the regulation has been infringed. The first group of provisions is the lesser one of 
the three and includes the infringement of the obligations of the controller or the proces-
sor, certification body or the monitoring body. The size of the fines is up to 10 000 000 
EUR or up to 2% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the previous financial year, 
whichever is larger. [13] 
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In two of the three categories, the fines are up to 20 000 000 EUR or 4% of the turnover 
depending on which is larger. These groupings consider more severe infringements that 
violate, for example, the basic principles of the regulation and the data subjects’ rights or 
if the controller or processor is not complying with an order from the supervisory author-
ity. The regulation also orders the member states to abide by these measures and without 
delay inform the Commission of the laws and changes to said laws that enforce these 
penalties in the member states. [13] 
 Data subject’s rights 
Under the GDPR the data subject has several rights which apply in most scenarios with 
exceptions regarding individual circumstances. These rights are detailed in the Chapter 
III articles 12-21. The regulation emphasises the openness of information processing and 
data collector must provide information about how the data subject's information is 
processed in a compact, transparent, quickly understood and widely used manner. The 
GDPR also sets a deadline for fulfilling the data subject's request: without undue delays 
and at a maximum one month from the request. [13] 
The data subject has a right to know if their data is processed and if it is, then a right to 
access their data that is processed and stored. Article 15 outlines this right. Also, the 
following information has to be sent to the data subject: reason for processing data, which 
categories the data falls into, recipients of the data if it has been or will be disclosed to 
another party, the period for which the data is being stored if possible, right to request 
erasure of the data, right to lodge a complaint, source of the information if it was not 
collected directly from the subject and the existence of automated decision making.  Right 
to obtain the copy of personal information must not conflict with the rights and freedoms 
of other data subjects. [13] 
Article 16 details the right of the data subject to request the correction of their inaccurate 
personal data and to have possible incomplete data completed. Article 17 introduces the 
right of erasure, meaning that the data subject has the right to ask for their data to be 
removed entirely from the data controller’s registry without undue delay. The data con-
troller is obligated to comply with the request if one of the following grounds is applica-
ble: 
• the data is no longer necessary for the purposes it was collected, 
• the data subject withdraws their consent for the processing of the data, and there 
are no legal grounds for processing the data, 
• the data subject objects to processing explained in Article 21(1) or Article 21(2), 
and there are no legitimate grounds to process the data, 
• data has been processed unlawfully, 
• the data is going to be erased due to legal obligation from a member state or the 
union, or 
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• the reason why personal data was collected were information society services re-
ferred to in Article 8(1) [13] 
If the erasure is applicable, then the controller must take the necessary steps to inform 
other controllers processing the data that its deletion has been requested. The right of 
erasure is not applicable in following special situations, where the processing is neces-
sary:  
• exercising the right of freedom of expression and information 
• there is a legal obligation from the member state law or from the Union to process 
the data  
• there is a public interest to process the data 
• the controller exercises their official authority 
• reasons of interest in the public health area following points h and i of Article 9(2) 
and Article 9(3) 
• the data is used for archiving purposes in areas of public interest, scientific re-
search purposes, historical research purposes or statistical purposes and the right 
of erasure severely impairs achieving the objectives of the processing 
• the data is used concerning legal claims [13] 
Article 18 details the right to a restriction of processing. If the correctness of the data is 
questioned, processing is deemed unlawful, or the controller no longer needs the data for 
the purposes it was collected for, then the data subject has the right to ask for their data 
processing to be restricted. The controller can still store this restricted data, but all pro-
cessing is ceased. There are exceptions to this. For example, the processor can analyse 
the data if it is needed for a legal claim. [13] 
The data subject has a right to data portability which is presented in article 20. Data port-
ability means that the data subject has the right to obtain the data a controller has on them 
in a commonly used machine-readable format and to send that data to another controller. 
If possible, the controller should send the data directly to that another controller without 
having to send it to the subject. The collection of data must be based on consent and 
processing must be automated for this right to be applicable. If the processing is carried 
out in public interest or controller exercises their official authority, then this right does 
not apply. [13] 
The last right presented by the GDPR is the right to object in Article 21. The data subject 
can at any time object to the processing of their data, including profiling. Without a com-
pelling reason or without an existing legal requirement, the controller must stop pro-
cessing the subject's information. In the regulation, this right is mainly directed towards 
direct marketing. In case the personal data is processed for scientific, historical or statis-
tical reasons, the right to object is still relevant unless these tasks are carried out in the 
name of public interest. [13] 
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 The GDPR and information security 
In addition to privacy improvements, the GDPR also guides data controllers on infor-
mation security. These guidelines are laid out in more detail in part 83 of the introduction 
chapter of the legislation and article 32. The GDPR requires the controller and the pro-
cessor to ensure through risk analysis that their information security measures are in or-
der. The risk concerning personal information is higher when the data processor is pro-
cessing large amounts of data or if the processing involves data that merits specific pro-
tection. Such data is particularly sensitive, and the regulation lists examples such as eth-
nicity, religion and data concerning children. Regulations related to information security 
are non-specific and technology independent on purpose since the protection should be 
technology independent and applicable in many different situations. [13] 
The data controller must ensure that the subjects' data is protected during each step from 
the point the data is gathered through the time the data is in storage or being processed 
and finally ensure that the data is safely deleted after it is no longer being used. [13] These 
requirements effectively seem to mean data protection during transit, at rest and in use.  
While the GDPR remains general in the information security specifications, it still sug-
gests ways to increase the level of security concerning the results of risk analysis. These 
measures include encryption, pseudonymisation of the data, enforcing the attributes pre-
sented by the CIA definition, the resilience of the systems, keeping necessary backups, 
testing and evaluating the software and organisational measures [13]. The appropriate 
level of security is formed based on the risks presented by the processing of the data [13]. 
At a glance, all these measures seem logical and concur with many of the best practices 
presented in the literature. Legislative measures can compel developers and designers to 
take these measures into account better when designing software and that way help in 
overall preparedness. While some more direct measures aimed at improving information 
security can exist on a national level, for example in official guidelines, a more general 
approach is fitting when designing regulation for the whole continent.  
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6. NATIONAL PRIVACY LAWS 
To get a better view of the effects of the GDPR, a closer examination of national privacy 
laws is taken. Three example countries and their legislations related to individual privacy 
and health information were chosen. Two of them, Finland and France, are EU member 
states, and the third is The United States of America. The GDPR does not directly affect 
the USA but comparing two European legislations to legislations outside Europe shows 
the differences and potential markets for different software products. The comparison 
also highlights the differences between the GDPR and previously existing legislations. 
The analysis of the laws of Finland and France pertained to the legislations made before 
the GDPR. The regulation has changed or will change these laws so that they are compli-
ant with the regulation. 
 The United States of America 
The USA differs in its privacy-related regulations from many other industrialised nations. 
Solove and Hartzog [43] describe the current laws as “a hodgepodge of various constitu-
tional protections, federal and state statutes, torts, regulatory rules, and treaties”. Whereas 
in other countries privacy laws are more all-encompassing, in the US different laws reg-
ulate different industries [43]. Esteve [12] points out that the fragmented nature of the 
legislative framework of the US makes the legislation harder for European scholars to 
understand.  
The sectoral approach in the US leaves gaps in the overall regulation notably on the fed-
eral level [43]. These gaps are still regulated though by privacy policies that companies 
have, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces these policies. The FTC can act 
on perceived breaching of a promise made in these policies or if some practice is deemed 
unfair or deceptive [43]. These measures are declared in Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act [17]. The FTC can sanction companies from wrongdoings but does so 
rarely, and many cases are settled outside of the courts [43]. The fines given by the FTC 
are perceived to be small. Solove and Hartzog [43] also note that FTC can influence com-
panies through fear since their auditing process is long and extensive. 
As Solove and Hartzog [43] point out, the enforcement of these regulations by the FTC 
has given it a sprawling jurisdiction, and currently, the FTC has more territory regarding 
privacy than any other agency. The largeness of its jurisdiction makes FTC the primary 
source of regulation in several instances where companies are not in the domain of other 
specific privacy laws. As for the reasons this expansion has happened, Solove and Hart-
zog give two reasons: FTC’s jurisdiction has broadened, and FTC’s enforcement frame-
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work has been a good fit for self-regulatory attitudes of policy-makers. [43] Self-regula-
tion seems to be prevalent in the US with companies enacting their privacy policies and 
FTC making sure that companies abide by their privacy policies [12]. 
Solove [42] discusses the problems that the idea of privacy self-management causes in 
the US. Privacy self-management is an idea that an individual should self-manage what 
information is available of them. Solove [42] points out that privacy self-management is 
challenging in practice because of several reasons: 
• the individual might not be informed enough to able to make those decisions,  
• the individual’s behaviour is affected mainly by how the question of privacy is 
framed and based on the background knowledge a person has, 
• the individual has a problem with the sheer amount of entities that collect per-
sonal data, 
• the individual cannot know how even smaller pieces of data can be aggregated in 
the future, 
• the individual is unable to accurately assess the harm that sharing information 
might bring alongside it. 
Privacy self-management also relates to the concept of consent. Solove [42] argues that 
consent is an easy concept to hide behind since consent can legitimise almost any kind of 
information collection. Esteve reminds that even though a choice is given to an individual 
on how they can use their personal information and that is enforced by the FTC; there is 
no requirement from the US law and no detailed rules limiting the data collection that 
companies can do [12].   
Privacy self-management as an idea seems to be the antithesis of what the GDPR is. 
Solove’s arguments about the concept of consent being problematic are valid, since if 
anything can be legitimised, then every practice could be justified by asking for a person’s 
consent. That person might not know all they should and might even be deceived by 
framing the consent form or a privacy policy so that it is complicated for an individual to 
know what they are consenting to. Of course, the US is not a singular place concerning 
legislation, but a mix of individual responsibility and federal laws, so many examples 
cannot be strictly generalised. It does seem however that the splintered kind of privacy 
legislation can cause unnecessary confusion and reasonable doubts.  
As different industries have their privacy laws, the medical field has a dedicated law. The 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 required the US 
Department of Human Services (HHS) to adopt national standards for electronic health 
care transactions and security [50]. HIPAA consists of two parts: portability, meaning 
that an individual should be able to keep their health insurance if they are changing jobs 
and accountability to ensure the confidentiality and security of patients’ information [7]. 
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The latter of these parts is more relevant to the subject matter of this thesis. Several pro-
visions were added to the act to help ensure federal protections for health information that 
could be individually identifiable. These provisions are the privacy rule, security rule, 
enforcement rule and final omnibus rule [50]. Solove and Hartzog [43] note that HIPAA 
does not cover all medical data and state laws can cover medical data more thoroughly.  
The privacy rule is meant to ensure that individuals’ personally identifiable health infor-
mation is protected accordingly. Anonymous data is left out of the scope of the privacy 
rule. The rule covers health plans, health care providers and health care clearinghouses. 
The privacy rule attempts to limit the circumstances where the identifiable health data is 
used and who can use or see the data. For example, the patient’s data should only be 
shown to the patient or a government official. The privacy rule details individual rights, 
such as that a patient has the right to obtain and see their protected health information and 
to restrict the use or disclosure of their patient data. Although in the case of restriction, 
the privacy rule mentions that the entity that processes the data is not obligated to restrict 
the processing. This most likely means the same as in the GDPR, that there are instances 
where the restriction right is not applicable. Individuals also have a right to amend incor-
rect or incomplete health information. The entity is also required to implement the neces-
sary safeguards so that the privacy rule can be followed. These measures include assign-
ing a privacy official and writing a privacy policy as well as training personnel. [51] 
The security rule makes the privacy rule more concrete by addressing the technical and 
non-technical safeguards to secure individuals’ electronic protected health information 
(e-PHI) [52]. The general rules of the security rule are: 
1. Ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of all e-PHI that the entity 
creates, receives, maintains or transmits 
2. Identify and protect against foreseeable threats to the security or integrity of the 
information. 
3. Protect against foreseeable impermissible uses or disclosures 
4. Ensure workforce compliance [52] 
The security rule defines the CIA attributes as: “e-PHI is not available or disclosed to 
unauthorised persons” (confidentiality), “e-PHI is not altered or destroyed in an unau-
thorised manner” (integrity) and “e-PHI is accessible and usable on demand by an author-
ised person” (availability). The security rule is meant to be flexible, as was the privacy 
rule. Risk analysis and management are suggested to find out which protection measures 
are the most useful. In addition to administrative safeguards, the security rule requires 
physical and technical safeguards. Physical safeguards include facility access and control 
and workstation and device security. Technical safeguards consist of access control, audit 
control, integrity control and transmission security. [52] 
The enforcement rule of HIPAA contains compliance and investigative provisions, pro-
cedures for hearings organised when there is a suspicion of wrongdoing and imposition 
30 
 
 
of civil money penalties for violations. In 2013 an omnibus rule was added to HIPAA 
because of another act, Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
(HITECH), mandated changes. These changes specified more accurate measures, such as 
business associates of the entities under the influence of HIPAA also became liable to a 
certain extent. Also, a breach notification rule was defined, so that the entities would have 
to report data breaches to the Secretary of HHS within 60 days. If the breach affects over 
500 individuals, then the entity must notify the media. HHS’s Office for Civil Rights is 
the instance responsible for enforcing the rules of the HIPAA. Violations of the HIPAA 
may result in civil money penalties or a criminal investigation if the violation is severe 
enough. [53] 
HIPAA’s privacy and security measures are not far from the GDPR. HIPAA seems to be 
more specific than the GDPR in some instances, like providing concrete examples of 
safeguards that could prevent violations. Then again HIPAA is an act of one nation, albeit 
a federal one concerning all the states in the US whereas the GDPR is almost a continent-
wide regulation and keeping it as general as possible might be deemed better. Both legis-
lations are formed as all-encompassing, so they share similarities. What is surprising is 
the mention that an individual under HIPAA does have the right to restrict processing, 
but the entity is not obligated to comply with the request. Of course, the same applies to 
the GDPR since there are situations where the restriction is not possible, and the data 
controller must tell the individual why.  
Regarding the chosen examples for this thesis, the USA is unique. It is apparent from the 
nature of the US privacy law framework why an outsider might view the legislation as 
lacking or loose. Then again as Esteve notes, companies like Google and Facebook can 
be the target of fines or other legislative measures in both the EU and the US [12]. The 
FTC does have influence the US. It also seems apparent that various legal protections 
bring with them the issue of according to which law should a perceived violation of pri-
vacy be judged? Solove and Hartzog [43] mention the attempt in the past to treat compa-
nies’ privacy policies as contracts so that contract law could be applied to them. That has 
not been successful, and privacy policies have not been thought of as contracts in court 
cases so that argument has not stuck [43].  
 Finland 
Before the GDPR, Finland as an EU member state was affected by the previous EU di-
rective 95/46/EC. Finland’s Personal Data Act (Henkilötietolaki) 523/1999 [19] was the 
primary legislature considering data protection before the GDPR and Act on the Elec-
tronic Processing of Client Data in Healthcare and Social Welfare (Laki sosiaali- ja ter-
veydenhuollon asiakastietojen sähköisestä käsittelystä) 159/2007 [18] included measures 
to protect data that relates to patients.  
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Terms familiar from the GDPR are also included in the Personal Data Act, such as per-
sonal data, processing of personal data, controller and data subject and they mean essen-
tially the same here. The processing of personal data must be planned before the data is 
collected and the data must be used according to the original purpose. The Personal Data 
Act details the general prerequisites for processing personal data as follows: 
1. the data subject has given an unambiguous consent for the processing, 
2. the data subject has given an assignment, the data subject is a party of a contract 
or processing is necessary to take steps at the request of the data subject before 
entering a contract, 
3. processing is necessary to protect data subject’s vital interests, 
4. processing is based on the provisions of another Act or is necessary for compli-
ance with an obligation that is directed at the controller, 
5. there is a connection requirement, meaning that there is a relevant connection be-
tween the data subject and controller. For example, the data subject is in service 
of the controller, 
6. the data relates to clients or employees of a group of companies or a comparable 
organisation, 
7. processing is necessary for payment traffic, computing or comparable task, 
8. circumstance concerns generally available information on the status, duties or per-
formance of a person in a public corporation or business. Data is processed to 
safeguard the controller or a third party, or 
9. the Data Protection Board (Tietosuojalautakunta) has issued a permit for the pro-
cessing. [19] 
Only accurate and necessary personal data should be processed. Processing of sensitive 
data, such as race or sexual preferences, is prohibited unless there is a good reason for it, 
such as the processing is based on provisions of an act requiring it. The authorities of data 
protection are the Data Protection Ombudsman (Tietosuojavaltuutettu) and the Data Pro-
tection Board. The ombudsman provides guidance and direction, supervises the pro-
cessing and makes decisions based on the Personal Data Act. The board deals with ques-
tions that relate to the processing of personal data. Both the ombudsman and the board 
have the right to access personal data that is processed, and information related to the 
legality of the processing. [19] 
The Personal Data Act defines several data subject rights. Section 24 “Information on the 
processing of data” demands that the controller must provide information about itself and 
the purpose of processing the personal data to the data subject. Section 25 adds to infor-
mation on the processing of data by declaring that if the personal data has been obtained 
for direct marketing, the data subject has the right to know the data controller, controller’s 
address and the name of the person register they used. The right of access details that data 
subjects have a right to access data saved of them or to a notice that no data is saved. The 
right of access is not applicable in all situations, for example, in matters concerning na-
tional security or if the data is used exclusively for a historical or scientific study. The 
right of access entails that the data subject must prove their own identity when requesting 
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access and that the controller must provide the information without undue delay. The data 
controller must provide a reason for declining the request. [19] 
If the right of access request relates to data about the data subject in the files of healthcare 
authorities, institutions, physicians, dentists or other health care professionals related to 
the state of the data subject’s illness or health, the data subject must request a physician 
or other healthcare professional. The professional will then act on behalf of the data sub-
ject and obtain the data for the data subject to view. The data subject also has the right to 
rectify erroneous, unnecessary, obsolete or incomplete data without undue delay. The data 
controller can decline if a compelling reason exists. The last right of the data subject is to 
prohibit processing of their data for direct marketing, distance selling, market research, 
opinion polls, public registers or genealogical research. Also, automated decision making 
is only permitted if an act provides the decision making or the decision is made due to an 
agreement. [19] 
The Personal Data Act additionally includes information security requirements to im-
prove data security and storage of personal data. For data security, the controller must 
implement technical and organisational measures for securing personal data from unau-
thorised access, accidental or unlawful destruction, manipulation, disclosure, transfer or 
unlawful processing in general. These measures should consider the techniques available, 
costs, quality and quantity of the data. Those who have gained access to and knowledge 
of characteristic of personal data shall not disclose the data. This non-disclosure is called 
the secrecy obligation. If personal data is no longer necessary, then it must be destroyed 
unless specific provisions are preventing that. Personal data may be transferred for ar-
chival or to be used by a higher education facility if the National Archives grant permis-
sion. [19] 
As for the penalties detailed in the act, the registry keeper is obligated to compensate for 
the damages caused by the possible processing of personal data in violation of the Per-
sonal Data Act. The penalty for a personal data offence, for breaking into a personal data 
file and for violating a secrecy obligation is detailed in the Penal Code (Rikoslaki) 
(39/1889). The Personal Data Act declares that a person shall be fined for a personal data 
violation if they are found guilty of gross negligence or intentionally breaking the provi-
sions of the Act. Then again if a more severe penalty is detailed elsewhere, then the person 
will be sentenced according to that. [19] 
Because of the national scale of the Personal Data Act, it describes more detailed 
measures than the GDPR does. Both the Finnish Act and the regulation mention the need 
for a consent from the data subject and that personal data should be processed for only 
those ends that the data was originally collected. Both require the data to be accurate, and 
that sensitive data should not be processed without a proper reason. The data subject rights 
also share similarities like the right to request information and correct erroneous infor-
mation.  
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There are differences too. Overall the GDPR’s data subject rights are much more detailed 
and, for example, the right of erasure is more explicit. The Finnish Personal Data Act 
requires that data be erased if it is no longer needed but does not explicitly state that an 
individual data subject has the right to request the erasure of their data. Also, the act does 
not define sanctions for breaking it but relegates that duty to other acts and codes depend-
ing on the charge. The Personal Data Act is more detailed about the practicalities of fol-
lowing the Act correctly which is explained by the national scope of the law. Overall 
though the Personal Data Act does not differ that much from the GDPR apart from more 
concrete measures presented in the regulation in some parts. 
Act on the Electronic Processing of Client Data in Healthcare includes measures on 
healthcare data processing. The act also produces a unified electronic handling and filing 
system for patient data to produce health care services securely and to give citizens access 
to their data, called Kanta. [18] 
The handling of patient data must be secured. The data’s availability and usability must 
be guaranteed, as well as the integrity. The service providers must keep logging infor-
mation and registry about the usage of their services and when the data is handed over to 
another party. This other party must be another healthcare service provider, and the data 
must be used to guarantee the treatment to a patient. The patient can also prohibit this 
data exchange. [18] 
The act uses the term customer for the data subjects of these health care services. The 
customer has the right to be informed about the health care services, how they are used 
and of the legal rights the patient has. They also have the right to be informed of how 
their information is passed to other parties.  The customer has a right to view information 
that has been stored of them as was detailed in the Personal Data Act. In addition to view-
ing the stored information they have the right to view log information about who has used 
that information and whether the information has been extradited to another party and 
why it has been used or extradited. There are exceptions though and over two-year-old 
log information is not required to be handed over. Log information is also not required to 
be shown if it is viewed that the information in the logs would endanger the patient or 
someone else’s rights. [18] 
The act details information security measures. The system fulfils the requirements when 
it is designed and produced so that it fulfils the laws regarding privacy and information 
security and works according to them. The act divides information systems to two cate-
gories A and B according to their connection to the Kanta service. If the service is part of 
Kanta service or connects to it through a proxy service, it is category A. All other systems 
belong to category B. Category A service must prove that the system fulfils all privacy 
and information security requirements given by approved joint testing and with a certifi-
cate given by information security evaluation facility. Category B software must prove 
that their system fulfils the requirements talked earlier. The service provider must develop 
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a self-regulatory plan regarding the privacy and information security of the service. The 
plan must detail how the software is administrated, used and so forth. [18] 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health’s decree 298/2009 defines separately about patient 
files, how they should be used and what is saved into them. The decree details that the 
logging files defined in the healthcare act must be preserved intact for 12 years. Along 
these instructions, the decree’s appendix includes orders on the preservation of patient 
files. For example, the patient’s necessary information and files containing essential 
health care information must be preserved for 12 years after the patient has died or 120 
years from the patient’s birthday, if the time of death is not known. [20] 
The Finnish healthcare act is much more general in appearance than USA’s HIPAA. Then 
again in Finland, the Personal data Act contains most of the more practical legislature and 
the health care act the needed additional details. The Kanta service details take a large 
part of the act, and not much additional detail is given on how the service providers can 
make sure if the services are sound concerning information security and privacy. The 
personal data act is much more useful in that regard. The decree 298/2009 offers more 
regarding how long files should be preserved. 
 France 
In France, the authority responsible for data protection is Commission Nationale de l’ 
Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) [9]. The critical regulation regarding data protection 
is Act No 78-17 of 6 January 1978 on Information Technology, Data Files and Civil Lib-
erties [9]. There have been several amends to the act over the years, and the directive that 
preceded the GDPR has affected the act as well. The act applies to the automatic and non-
automatic processing of personal data unless the processing is done for purely private 
reasons. 
The data protection act defines personal data as any information related to a natural person 
who can be identified (indirectly or directly) by reference to an identification number or 
other specific factors. The personal data is lawfully processed if it has been obtained law-
fully or through an explicit consent. The data must also be accurate and relevant to the 
processing and not retained longer than there is a need for retaining. The act does mention 
that the data can be retained longer if it is used for historical, statistical and scientific 
purposes, an explicit agreement has been given, CNIL has authorised it, or the data is 
used for medical research or public interest. The act differentiates between the data con-
troller and data processor like the GDPR. Specific categories, like race or religion, of 
personal data, cannot be processed without reasons such as protection of human life, ex-
plicit consent is given or legal claim. There are fascinating details related to specific cat-
egories. For example, these categories can be processed when the data subject has made 
the information public or processing is carried out by a non-profit association. [9] 
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The act also details the duties of CNIL. The authority shall inform data subjects and data 
controllers of their rights and duties and ensure that the processing of personal data is 
carried out according to the act. If personal data is processed automatically, the CNIL 
must be notified, though not in all instances. An example of this is state security and 
criminal offences. The CNIL has specified standard formats for the notifications which 
the data processors must send to CNIL. [9] 
The act describes the obligations for data controller and the rights of individuals. The data 
controller must inform the data subject from whom the data is obtained. This information 
contains parts such as the purpose of processing the data, the controller’s identity and if 
the data is going to be transferred to a non-member state of the EU. The requirement of 
informing the data subject does not apply, for example, in state security-related data col-
lecting. In parts, the act is comprehensive and for example, describes how the certificates 
for electronic signatures must be obtained directly from the data subject. [9] 
Regarding the nature of the data and risks of processing the act compels the data controller 
to take useful precautions and prevent the alteration, damage and unauthorised access to 
the data. The CNIL must be immediately notified of data breaches and the affected indi-
vidual. The notification to the affected individuals is not mandatory if CNIL has deter-
mined that the data that was breached have been made undecipherable. [9] 
Regarding the rights of individuals, the act describes several. A natural person is entitled 
to object to the processing of their data. Right to object does not apply if there are legal 
obligations for data processing. The data subject also has the right to be informed about 
the processing concerning them if their identity has been proven, the right of access. This 
information includes: 
• confirmation that their data or part of it is indeed processed 
• purpose of processing, categories of personal data processed and to whom the data 
is disclosed to 
• whether the data is transferred to a non-EU member state 
• the personal data itself and its origin 
• information on the logic of automated processing, although this must not violate 
any intellectual property rights. [9] 
Data controllers can ask for a sum of money for delivering the data subject their data and 
can decline unreasonable requests. Data subjects can also request their data to be rectified, 
completed, updated, blocked or deleted if their data is inaccurate, incomplete, equivocal, 
expired or if the collection, usage, disclosing or retention is prohibited. This request is 
called the right of rectification. The burden of proof is on the data controller to justify that 
a necessary operation has been carried and if the case is disputed. The act also mentions 
explicitly personal medical data with the right of access. The data may be disclosed to the 
data subject directly, or through a doctor the data subject designates. [9] 
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If a data controller does not process the data according to the act, CNIL has several means 
of sanctioning the controller. CNIL can serve a notice to the data controller urging them 
to change their data processing activities. If the data controller does not comply with this 
request in due time, CNIL may pronounce financial sanctions or an injunction to cease 
the processing. If the processing activities are deemed to lead to violations of rights and 
liberties of data subjects, CNIL can interrupt the processing or in more critical cases use 
any security measure necessary for the protection of said liberties and rights. Regarding 
the financial sanctions, the first sanction due to a breach cannot be over €150 000 in size. 
If a second one happens during the next five years, the maximum is €300 000 or 5% of 
the previous annual revenue, although that cannot exceed €300 000 either. There are also 
criminal provisions mentioned. These provisions are used, for example, when the data 
controller is not providing the correct information about stored information records. [9] 
The act mentions explicitly medical research related data processing in chapter nine.  
CNIL gives authorisation to the use of personal medical data for research purposes. Data 
which allows for the identification of individuals must be codified, although it is not man-
datory if the nature of the research demands identification. Data subjects have the right to 
object to this, and in case of identifying biological samples, express consent is required. 
Chapter ten then goes on to detail measures related to the processing of medical data for 
the evaluation or analysis of care and prevention. This kind of processing is permitted by 
the CNIL. This kind of personal data cannot be used so that a subject can be identified 
although some data points can exist, but not attributes like the social security number. 
The Public Health Code details more concerning personal medical data. [9] 
As the United States of America and Finland, France has their more healthcare related 
privacy legislation in a separate law called the Public Health Code. Some of the articles 
of the Public Health Code are mentioned in the Act No 78-17 of 6 January 1978 on In-
formation Technology, Data Files and Civil Liberties [9]. Since the French Public Health 
Code is remarkably more protracted than the health-related legislations of USA and Fin-
land, it is not explained further in this thesis. Luckily the Act No 78-17 contains mentions 
of health-related rules, and since the directive preceding the GDPR naturally affected 
France as an EU member state, no vast gaps are formed to the discussion. France is still 
a good example to include in this comparison since the Act No 78-17 is detailed and 
provides an excellent counterpoint to the Finnish Personal Data Act. 
In the French privacy legislation, the level of detail seems to be higher than in the Finnish 
Personal Data Act or the GDPR. It is interesting to see how the Finnish and French data 
protection acts differ from each other as they were both affected by the 95/46/EC di-
rective. The unifying aim of the GDPR comes apparent as more differences in member 
state legislations are bound to exist. The French act contains data breach notifications 
requirements and detailed sanctions whereas the Finnish act is missing both. The similar-
ities are still the majority, and the individual rights presented by the acts are for the most 
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part identical. HIPAA resembles the Act No 78-17 more than the Finnish Personal Data 
Act, as both HIPAA and Act No 78-17 are quite concrete. 
 Summary of the discussed laws 
The United States of America differs from France and Finland partly due to the differen-
tiation of federal and state laws. France and Finland are both members of the EU and 
having implemented the directive 95/46/EC; they still have some variety between their 
data protection related legislations. If the HIPAA is looked at like the acts of Finland and 
France, they are surprisingly similar considering how the law in the USA can be perceived 
to be different.   
The comparison points of the different legislations are collected to Table 2. As can be 
seen from the table, when the requirements extracted from the legislations are put side by 
side and condensed, the differences are not significant. It may seem that the GDPR does 
not add to the overall field of privacy legislations that many new aspects while looking at 
Table 2. The table emphasises that the GDPR’s influence is not necessarily the number 
of details or unique attributes. Instead, the aim seems to be more a more profound foun-
dational change to how the information is handled and how individuals can affect that 
handling.  
Table 2. Summary of the discussed legislations 
Legislative attribute The United 
States of  
America 
Finland France The GDPR 
Special categories 
of personal  
data were  
presented. 
Not detailed in  
analysed  
legislative texts. 
Several  
categories, 
such as:  
ethnicity,  
religious  
affiliation, 
trade union 
membership,  
health,  
sexual  
preferences. 
Several  
categories, 
such as Race,  
ethnicity, 
political-,  
religious-, or 
philosophical 
opinions, 
health, sexual 
life 
Several  
categories, 
such as:  
genetic data, 
health and 
sex life. 
Children’s  
personal 
data is also a 
special  
category. 
Separate laws/acts 
for electronic  
medical data  
processing and  
privacy. 
Federal level pri-
vacy act does not 
exist, but FTC’s 
Federal Trade 
Commission Act 
is applicable. For 
medical data: 
HIPAA. 
Personal Data 
Act and Act on 
the Electronic 
Processing of 
Client Data in 
Healthcare  
Act No 78-17 
of 6 January 
1978 on  
Information 
Technology, 
Data Files and 
Civil Liberties 
and The Public 
Health Code 
Primarily 
contains 
privacy re-
lated articles, 
but data  
concerning 
health is also 
detailed. 
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The individual has 
a right to access or 
view personal data 
that has been 
stored of them. 
HIPAA details that 
individuals have a 
right to access 
and review their 
protected health 
information. Not 
detailed in the 
Federal Trade 
Commission Act. 
Detailed in the 
Personal Data 
Act. Also  
includes other 
information, 
such as the 
source and  
usage of the 
data. 
Detailed in the 
Act No 78-17. 
Also includes 
other infor-
mation, such 
as recipients 
and categories 
of the data. 
 
Detailed in 
the GDPR. 
Also includes 
other 
information,  
such as  
purposes of  
processing, 
categories of 
data, storage 
period. 
The individual has 
a right to restrict 
the  
processing of their  
personal data. 
Under HIPAA, 
restrict use or  
disclosure of 
health infor-
mation. Not  
detailed in the 
FTC act. 
Not detailed in 
the analysed 
legislative 
texts. 
Not detailed in 
the analysed 
legislative 
texts. 
Processing 
must be  
restricted 
upon request 
where  
applicable. 
The individual has 
a right to ask for 
their personal data 
to be removed. 
Not detailed in  
analysed  
legislative texts. 
Personal data 
should be  
deleted if it is 
no longer 
needed or it is 
unnecessary.  
Individual may 
ask the data 
controller to 
delete their 
personal data. 
A right of 
erasure is 
included in 
the regula-
tion with  
exceptions. 
The individual has 
a right to ask for 
correction or  
completion of their  
personal data. 
Under HIPAA, in-
complete or incor-
rect personal data 
can be amended. 
Not mentioned in 
the FTC act. 
Erroneous,  
unnecessary, 
incomplete or 
obsolete per-
sonal data can 
be rectified. 
Incomplete or 
incorrect per-
sonal data can 
be completed 
and corrected. 
Rectification 
of incorrect 
or incom-
plete per-
sonal data is  
detailed. 
The individual has 
a right for data  
portability from one 
data controller to 
another. 
Not detailed in  
analysed  
legislative texts. 
Not detailed in  
analysed  
legislative 
texts. 
Not detailed in  
analysed  
legislative 
texts. 
When 
processing is 
automatic 
and based 
on consent. 
The individual has 
a right to object  
to the processing 
of their personal 
data. 
Not detailed in the 
analysed  
legislative texts. 
Yes, although  
constrained to  
specific cases. 
Can object to 
the processing 
of any data  
related to the 
data subject. 
At any time, 
the right to 
object to the 
processing of 
personal 
data is in ef-
fect. 
Special measures 
are detailed against  
automatic  
processing. 
Not detailed in the 
analysed legisla-
tive texts. 
Decision  
making based 
on purely auto-
matic pro-
cessing is  
permitted only 
in certain situ-
ations. 
Several 
mentions of 
the restriction 
of automatic 
processing 
and decision 
making. 
Right to not 
be a subject 
for purely au-
tomated pro-
cessing, in-
cluding profil-
ing. 
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Sanctions are 
detailed for not fol-
lowing the  
requirements  
presented in the 
legislation. 
FTC can both fine 
companies and 
subject them to 
audits. 
HIPAA details civil 
money penalties 
and criminal  
sanctions. 
Fines and 
other 
measures,  
although these 
are not 
discussed in  
detail in the 
analysed acts. 
Fines between 
150 000€ - 
300 000€. 
Also, criminal 
provisions are 
possible. 
Different 
sanction  
categories. 
The 
maximum is 
20 000 000€ 
or 4% annual 
turnover. 
A supervisory au-
thority is detailed.  
Yes, FTC for pri-
vacy and HHS for 
HIPAA. 
Data protec-
tion board and 
the data pro-
tection om-
budsman. 
The CNIL Member 
states pro-
vide public 
supervisory 
authorities 
who work 
with the 
Commission.  
Data breach  
notification 
requirement. 
HIPAA has a 
Breach Notifica-
tion Rule.  
Individuals and 
HHS secretary 
must be notified 
after a data 
breach and the 
media if the af-
fected amount of 
people is large. 
Not detailed in 
the analysed 
legislative 
texts. 
Notify CNIL 
immediately, 
individuals if 
their personal 
data has been 
breached  
unless CNIL  
orders  
otherwise. 
Within 72 
hours notify 
the supervi-
sory author-
ity, data sub-
ject if breach 
results in 
high risk to 
subjects. 
Means of gathering 
personal data is 
discussed. 
No mention of 
how personal 
data is gathered 
in HIPAA or the 
FTC act. 
Data is  
gathered and 
processed 
through an  
explicit  
consent or a 
legal  
requirement. 
Data is  
gathered and 
processed 
through an 
explicit  
consent or a 
legal  
requirement. 
Data is  
gathered and 
processed 
through an 
explicit  
consent or a 
legal  
requirement. 
 
France and Finland do not share the idea of self-management when related to privacy as 
much as the US does. The GDPR emphasises even to a greater extend the vaster level of 
unified data protection than the directive that preceded it, so the trend does not seem to 
be going towards the model of the US.  
It will be interesting to see if the GDPR changes anything regarding the legislation in the 
US and how. One effect might be the self-regulation of companies working both in the 
EU and in the US since those companies must abide by the GDPR. As having multiple 
data processing and protection conventions overlapping inside the same company might 
be deemed redundant, the companies could make the requirements of the GDPR the norm. 
Then again, the GDPR might be deemed too strict. While privacy laws of the US may be 
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deemed lacking, the GDPR might be a step into the other end. Esteve [12] notes that a 
balance between strict and lenient privacy law should be reached. 
One glaring difference between The US and the European legislations analysed was that 
no inclusion of data gathering means could be found considering the US. Finland, France 
and the GDPR all mention strictly about how the information collection must be based 
on an explicit consent or to a legal requirement. It is not surprising that HIPAA did not 
contain a mention of data collecting since most likely it is, for the most part, collected 
because of a legal requirement regarding the treating of a patient. Solove and Hartzog 
[43] explain that there does not exist a federal law that directly protects the data collection 
or use by entities like Amazon or Facebook. As was mentioned before, the companies’ 
privacy policies have a lot of say and FTC then supervises that these policies are re-
spected. The legislative attribute considering separated acts for medical data is marked 
“to some extent” in the case of the US because of this missing federal level law for pri-
vacy. There exists a federal level law for processing health related data, but not a single 
law for privacy. 
France and Finland do not have any mentions of specific technical measures or mentions 
of risk analysis in their privacy laws. The GDPR and HIPAA, even with their grander 
scale are more specific in this case than analysed member state acts. The GDPR might 
have included these measures to make the regulation more detailed and to be in line with 
larger best practices regarding information security and data protection.  
The Finnish data protection related acts were the only ones that did not mention any spe-
cifics about how data breaches should be handled. Personal Data Act does discuss sanc-
tioning the data controllers that do not follow the rules of the act and data breaches might 
be interpreted as belonging to that section of the act. The notification conventions related 
to data breaches are likely detailed elsewhere, but still, the Finnish data act differs in this 
case from the others. 
The magnitude of the fines that can be issued due to a data breach or other violation seems 
to have risen with the GDPR. While the fines the FTC has given in the US are perceived 
as small [43], and the fines of France are also relatively small, the GDPR’s sanctions are 
at least on paper many times what the previous maximums have been. What remains to 
be seen is how these fines are issued and whether cases are settled outside of the courts 
like what has happened in the US. 
Every legislation except the ones from the US contains a notion that some specific pieces 
of personal data, like religion and ethnicity, are more sensitive than other data points. 
What also seems to be missing from the HIPAA and FTC’s guidelines that are contained 
in other analysed legislations is automatic processing. Even before the GDPR, France and 
Finland specified measures against purely automatic processing and the GDPR continues 
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this path. HIPAA not mentioning automatic processing is not peculiar since such pro-
cessing could be more common in consumer services and there might be state level 
measures that restrict automatic processing. 
Regarding the data subject rights, the right of access to personal data and the right of 
rectification were in some name and form mentioned in every legislation. The right of 
restriction of processing was not detailed only in the Finnish Personal Data Act, although 
the right to object could be considered to cover some parts of the restriction. The right to 
object is then missing from the US federal law level. The right of erasure is missing from 
HIPAA which is understandable considering the application area of it, but it is apparent 
that the US does not have a federal level right for the individuals to erase their data from 
different data processors or data controllers. France and the GDPR have the most widely 
affecting applications of this right since in the Finnish perspective the data is only sup-
posed to be removed when it is no longer needed. An entirely new right the GDPR has is 
the right for data portability. HIPAA and 
The differences in the level of detail between the legislations are apparent. There exist 
strong reasons for this considering the different scopes of the analysed legislations, but 
excluding the GDPR’s scale, the Finnish acts are noticeably more ambiguous than the 
others. The Finnish health care-oriented act spends quite a lot of space in defining the 
Kanta service and leaves most of the data protection side to the Personal Data Act. In 
France, this kind of divide seems to be also true. In the United States, HIPAA is the de 
facto act for the health care industry, and otherwise, all-encompassing data protection act 
is missing. The FTC operates as the supervisory authority in these in-between cases and 
in that way reminds the French CNIL and the Finnish data protection board.  
The state laws of the USA were not analysed here which leaves gaps considering the 
comparison of legislations done in this chapter. The GDPR is a widescale regulation af-
fecting EU member states, so the analysed levels are similar. Analysing the legislation of 
each of the US state would nevertheless be out of the scope of this thesis. 
Based on this analysis, the GDPR can be determined to be the next step by the authorities 
to try to ensure an individual’s privacy. While the regulation does not seem to try and 
reinvent the wheel, it details as its basis a new way of thinking about data protection and 
how the companies must consider the individual while they are processing data. Whether 
there are glaring flaws or omissions in the regulation will be seen in the next few years, 
and the current contents might be refined as real life incidents, and cases arise. 
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7. MEDICAL SOFTWARE ANALYSIS 
The GDPR presents several new requirements for software applications as well as refin-
ing old ones. Since the regulation at the time of writing this thesis is new, some of these 
requirements and their impacts are not unequivocal. To make the changes presented by 
the GDPR more concrete, the requirements of the regulation are analysed concerning a 
medical software application. A medical software application is an excellent example of 
a software category that contains sensitive data and has been more heavily regulated even 
before the GDPR [22].  
The software application in question is a web application that is used for risk calculation 
related to screening taking place during pregnancy. The application contains patients' per-
sonal information and diagnosis data. The data the application primarily holds is classi-
fied by the GDPR as data concerning health in part 35 of the introductory section and is 
one special category of information gathering [13]. That is why the risks of processing 
such data can be considered high.  
In Finland, the software is classified as category B since it does not connect to the Kanta 
service. The software is used worldwide, so it has already had to comply with the legis-
lations of several different nations. Patients themselves do not use the software as it is 
meant for medical professionals to use. Also, system administrators administer the sys-
tem, so they have elevated privileges.  
The application’s architecture consists of a web server that client computers connect to 
and of a relational database for storing data to which the web-server is connected. The 
relational database used is Microsoft’s SQL Server and the web application framework 
used is .NET. The application supports Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox and Microsoft 
Internet Explorer browsers. There are several views in the application, where a user can, 
for example, search for patients based on several different parameters, view and fill in 
patient’s personal and diagnosis data and see the workflow status of patients. These all 
depend on the given user group rights. 
The application is deployed into an internal network of a site that is, for example, a hos-
pital with limited access to other networks via a demilitarised zone (DMZ). In network 
security a DMZ is denoted as a subnetwork in the internal network that is between two 
firewalls, the external one protecting DMZ from external networks and the internal fire-
wall protecting the internal network from DMZ itself [54, p. 297].  
The users are assigned to user groups of which there are several. Groups can also be added 
to the application. The groups restrict the actions a user can perform in the application, 
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and a user can belong to multiple groups. A user can also be removed from groups and 
the account shut off entirely. 
The application requires the user to log in with their user account. The password expires 
after 30 days, and the new password must be different from 10 previous passwords. Every 
password is encrypted, so they are not stored as plaintext. The application automatically 
signs the user out if they have not used the application during the last ten minutes to 
prevent unauthorised access and authentication issues. 
Two-step verification with a one-time token code can be used when logging in to add a 
layer of security into the application especially when a user logs in from outside of the 
internal network. The two-step verification is required when a user logs in to the applica-
tion from a public network with remote access. The application restricts the rights of the 
user when they log in remotely. When a user is part of a remote user user-group, they 
may only view, and query a limited amount of information related to their assigned pa-
tients.  
The descriptions of the software are kept general because of the sensitivity of privacy and 
information security related subjects. That is why no exact details are given so the soft-
ware application could not be singled out. However, the relevant and essential details 
related to this thesis’ analysis of the application are given so that an understanding of the 
application and its essential functions can be formed. 
The GDPR is a recent development and came to effect during the writing of this thesis. 
Regulations are contemplated in the national and EU courts where the regulation’s articles 
are thought upon on a case by case basis, forming more strong precedents regarding what 
practices of personal data processing are deemed suitable and lawful. The practicalities 
of the regulation are not entirely known since the GDPR is so new. Previous literature 
has also been mostly speculative and scarce. Lack of previous research is understandable 
since the regulation is new and has been in a transitional period for two years. 
The data controllers and processors must abide by the regulation if they intend to operate 
on the EU soil collecting the data of EU citizens even when some uncertainties exist. That 
is why it is beneficial to try and apply the regulation into a concrete example where the 
regulation must be considered when the application in question is developed further. This 
way a working example can be produced on how a software application can adhere to the 
GDPR which can then be hopefully applied to other applications as well.  
Privacy and security laws before the GDPR have been stricter for medical software ap-
plications because of the nature of the data they contain. While the GDPR brings new 
demands with it, such software has already had to comply with several requirements es-
pecially if the software is used internationally. By analysing a medical software applica-
tion from the GDPR’s viewpoint, the nature of the regulation’s changes is visible, and the 
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regulation’s new calls for the protection of sensitive data are weighed against previously 
existing rules and features of the software application. 
The knowledge of the features of the analysed medical software was gained through read-
ing the documents and the manual, further development and usage of the software. First, 
the brief overview of the software application is given, and the relevant requirements of 
the GDPR are discussed as some of the regulation’s measures are more relevant than 
others. Then the application’s present state is described and compared to the requirements 
of the GDPR.  
The comparison between the software’s current state and the requirements the software 
faces, in this case from the GDPR, is done with the help of ISO/IEC 25010 standard’s 
Product Quality Model [46]. After the evaluation of the present state, the required changes 
are listed. There are also some changes that would be beneficial but not compulsory to 
add to the overall security and privacy level of the application. These change proposals 
are then evaluated since they are bound to affect the functionality and the overall infor-
mation security and data protection level of the application. 
 Method of analysis 
The ISO/IEC 25010 standard defines two models: a quality in use model and product 
quality model, of which the latter is more appropriate in this case. The models provide a 
set of quality characteristics which can be evaluated with the help of needed requirements 
to measure the overall completeness of the software product. [46] 
The standard is part of the 25000 families of standards that form the System and software 
Quality Requirements and Evaluation (SQuaRE) for system and software engineering. 
The standard 2501n is the Quality Model Division that provides detailed quality models 
for computer systems. [46] 
The product quality model divides quality properties into eight characteristics which are 
further divided into sub-characteristics [46]. These are visualised in Figure 3. Not all these 
characteristics are relevant for this thesis, so the application is not analysed regarding all 
of them. The most relevant main characteristics regarding this thesis are functional suita-
bility and security. As explained in the standard the characteristics can be used as a check-
list, providing a basis for estimating the effort and activities that are needed in develop-
ment [46].  
The application is analysed concerning the functional suitability sub-characteristics. The 
sub-characteristics are functional completeness, functional correctness and functional ap-
propriateness. The standard defines these characteristics as: 
• functional completeness: how well the set of functions covers all the specified 
tasks and user objectives 
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• functional correctness: how well the system provides the correct results with the 
needed degree of precision 
• functional appropriateness: how well the functions facilitate the accomplishment 
of specified tasks and objectives [46] 
 
 
Figure 3. Software Product Quality Model [46] 
The ISO/IEC 25010 standard does not define metrics for the analysis, so such metrics are 
formed. A numerical score is given from a range specified in Table 3. for every detailed 
and relevant requirement of the GDPR concerning the sub-characteristics of functional 
suitability. The scoring is done to quantify the current state of the application. The table 
demonstrates an example concerning the right of data subjects to gain access to their 
personal data, to clarify the meaning of the grades. 
Grade one means that the sub-characteristic in the application’s current state is not com-
pliant with the requirement. The partial compliance represented by grade two means that 
while the application does contain some functionality or features to support the require-
ment, the software is mostly not compliant, and a fair amount of work is needed to make 
the application compliant. Grade three means that while the application is mostly com-
pliant with appropriate functionality and features, some work must be done to achieve 
compliance. Grade four means that the software is fully compliant already with a suitable 
functionality to fulfil the specified requirement. 
After the sub-characteristics have been rated, they must be aggregated to find out the 
overall state of the requirement and overall state of the application. Xu et al. [57] mention 
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that the arithmetic mean is not entirely suitable when analysing information security since 
it does not consider the principle of the weakest link. Merely using the minimum function 
would not fit either as every system with one serious flaw would be rated the same, so the 
analysis would not be distinctive. Xu et al. propose using the power mean, also called the 
generalised mean, with parameter value -2, as the function then emphasises lower values 
without completely disregarding the higher, better values. 
Table 3. The grading scale for the quality sub-characteristics 
Explanation Grade Example of 
completeness 
Example of cor-
rectness 
Example of appropri-
ateness 
Not fulfilled 1 The application’s 
functionality does 
not cover the 
right of access. 
The collected data 
does not contain 
any personal data 
of the data subject. 
The application does 
not contain functional-
ity that suits collecting 
the data subject per-
sonal data for the right 
of access. 
Partially fulfilled 2 The application’s 
functionality ad-
dresses some 
parts of the right 
of access, like an 
ability to generate 
reports in a 
widely used  
format. 
The personal data 
collected contains 
some pieces of 
data that is needed. 
For example, rele-
vant audit trail data 
but not any per-
sonal information. 
There is a functionality 
to collect personal 
data, but it also gath-
ers other data not 
suited for the data sub-
ject. 
Mostly fulfilled 3 The application’s 
functionality is 
mostly complete, 
but for example, 
the data is col-
lected to a diffi-
cult to use for-
mat. 
The personal data 
collected contains 
nearly every piece 
of data that is 
needed. For exam-
ple, all personal 
data and most of 
the audit data. 
There is a functionality 
that gives data sub-
jects access to their 
personal data, but it is 
meant for another 
usage. 
Fulfilled 4 The functionality 
covers all the 
steps required to 
gather and show 
data subject’s 
personal data in 
a commonly used 
form. 
The personal data 
collected contains 
every piece of data 
that is required by 
the right of access. 
There is a dedicated 
functionality to give a 
data subject access to 
their data, and the 
functionality is 
designed for this task. 
 
The approach of Xu et al. [57] fit the purposes of this analysis as well. The GDPR em-
phasises the overall security and data protection level of an application, so even a small 
number of serious flaws is a bad thing. Breaking any of the given user rights, for example, 
lands the data processor to the highest sanction category. So, it is not enough that most of 
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the rights are adequately implemented. That is why the smaller values should be 
emphasised.  
𝑴𝑝(𝑎1, 𝑎2, . . . , 𝑎𝑛) ≡ (
1
𝑛
 ∑ 𝑎𝑘
𝑝𝑛
𝑘=1 )
1
𝑝
                                                                                 (1)    
The generalised mean is presented the Equation 1. All ak ≥ 0. By changing the value of 
parameter p, the equation produces different means. For example, p=1 calculates the 
arithmetic mean. [5] In this analysis, the value p = -2 is used to emphasise the lower 
values accordingly. 
 The GDPR’s requirements 
The company that has created the application typically does not process the data them-
selves and does not receive it. The institutions where the application is used process the 
data. The data is collected both through a consent form that a patient fills out when they 
check in to an institution and through legal requirements. Since parts of the data gathering 
are carried out due to an explicit consent was given by a data subject, the rights of the 
subjects needed to be analysed and considered [13]. This analysis does not consider how 
the consent is collected since it is done on sites where this application is deployed. Since 
the company making the software does not receive the data, their data collection policies 
are not analysed. What they can do is to make sure that the application complies with the 
GDPR, so that their customers can enforce their compliance. Since it is also the aim of 
this thesis to analyse the GDPR and the requirements it brings, only the software appli-
cation is considered.  
Concerning all the rights, although some more than others, one significant question is 
how to get the patient’s request to the users of the application and then how to deliver the 
answer back to the patient. These questions will not be answered in this thesis since these 
are also the responsibility of the sites where this application is deployed. The Finnish 
Personal Data Act that preceded the GDPR stated that a data subject needs to contact a 
medical professional if they want to access their information contained in a healthcare 
related system and provide a valid identification to be able to see their data [19]. Even 
though the GDPR does not explicitly mention such qualification, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that confirming a data subject’s identity and answering their request would work 
in the same way in the future. 
As information is collected through consent from a patient, the individuals' rights need to 
be analysed and considered. The patient has the right to request access to the information 
that has been collected from them [13]. That data needs to be obtained transparently from 
the application and in a widely used format [13]. As the data needs to be in a clear format, 
it means that some thought must be put into the presentation of the information and that 
the format, such as the file type, should not be an obscure one, but instead, something 
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data subjects can access. Also, if the personal data is deemed to be inaccurate or insuffi-
cient, the patient has the right to request a correction to the data [13]. These two rights 
have already been included in the Finnish Personal Data Act [19] so, they do not bring 
any new major requirements as the application is approved to be used in Finland. The 
application should have a reporting functionality that gathers patient data into a widely 
used format that can be then sent to the patient that requested their data. The right of 
rectification details that the patient has a right to rectify inaccurate personal data belong-
ing to them. 
The right of erasure is not so clear-cut as the right to obtain data and the right to rectify 
data. While through consent the patient does have the right to request erasure of their data, 
other legislative measures may set restrictions to the usage of the erasure right. The GDPR 
specifies several exceptions to the right to erase data, and many of them are applicable 
here. In this case, public authority takes precedence since the medical organisation is ex-
ercising their public authority by treating a patient according to their personal infor-
mation. Also, the data is of interest to public health and for archival purposes. Member 
state law is also in the way in Finland for example, where the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health’s decree 298/2009 specifies the extent of information preservation for differ-
ent types of patient information [20].  
Then again it could be argued that in an individual case it would be beneficial to be able 
to remove someone's information from the application. For example, in the case of an 
erroneous entry made into the application that serves no purpose for the patient or the 
registry keeper, the entry should be able to be deleted due to the GDPR’s data minimisa-
tion requirements. Another case would be that someone’s data has been exported out of 
the application for archival and that data is not needed in that application anymore. Such 
a feature should be implemented so that only more privileged users can do it, only in a 
specific circumstance and not by accident. Still, while the functionality for erasing data 
would be beneficial, the wording of the GDPR does not require the right of erasure in the 
case of this application. 
Right to the restriction of processing is more straightforward than the right of erasure. If 
a patient wants the processing of their data to be restricted, then their patient information 
should be put aside and not processed until whatever the basis for the restriction was, is 
cleared. The restriction should not interfere with the obligations of the data collector. It 
can be inferred that it should be possible to restrict the processing of data if that is re-
quested and then be able to successfully and efficiently allow the usage if the reason for 
the restriction is no longer valid or if the data is needed again. A situation where the data 
might be needed again is, for example, a health-related reason where the personal data is 
needed for an accurate diagnosis or information on the state of the patient.   
Right to data portability can be ruled out in this case since one of the requirements along 
with the given consent is that the processing is automated. In the application, processing 
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is not automatic and is always initiated by a human user. That is why this right is not 
relevant or applicable to this application. Right to object is quite like restriction and eras-
ure since it prevents processing of data subject's data. It, however, is not deleted or put 
aside, instead, the processing is just stopped. This right should be considered in the case 
of the analysed application although if such a request comes from a data subject, the col-
lector can provide compelling reasons why the right to object is not applicable such as 
the patient needs to be treated according to law and the processing of the data is necessary 
for the treatment. 
In addition to the data subject's rights, the information security measures and guidelines 
in the regulation need to be considered. The data processed in the application likely has a 
high-risk nature which needs to be considered when analysing the application. The per-
sonal data must be adequately protected when it is stored in the database or elsewhere, 
transmitted from a part of the application to another and when the data is in use. Encryp-
tion is one answer since with the necessary and appropriate level of encryption it is a 
challenging task for an adversary to figure out what the data contains. The case for en-
cryption is especially real for the transmitted data as it is virtually impossible for an eaves-
dropper to decipher encrypted data moving in a network if the used encryption is strong 
enough.  
Anonymisation of the data is not applicable in the case of the analysed application and 
anonymising the data would have taken out of the GDPR’s scope. Pseudonymisation is 
more applicable as it is not necessary to use a patient’s name, social security number or 
similar for identifying them in every part of the application and the database. By using 
pseudonyms even though a part of the database would be compromised the real identities 
of the patients might not be revealed as the patients would be identified by their pseudo-
nyms across the database excluding a few tables that link the pseudonym to the actual 
data subject. 
Enforcing confidentiality, integrity and availability as well as authenticity is paramount 
in the application. Previously mentioned encryption is one way, but proper access control 
and other industry best practices should also be followed. Measures such as organisational 
ones, backups and resilience while necessary are not in focus here as sites who operate 
this application most likely implement these practices. The application should be able to 
support these measures, and the company that is developing the application can issue 
guidelines on how the product should be used.  
The requirements derived from the GDPR are as follows: 
1. Right to access data 
2. Right to rectification 
3. Right to a restriction of processing 
4. Right to object 
5. Data protected in use 
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6. Data protected in transit 
7. Data protected at rest 
The data subject rights are straightforward when forming the requirements, but the infor-
mation security requirements are more general in nature. Because the regulation requires 
complete data lifecycle protection, the requirements were distilled into three require-
ments: data protected at rest, in transit and in use. These cover the use cases of the per-
sonal data and current information security and data protection measures for each can be 
evaluated. 
 Present state of the application 
Currently, the application has extensive reporting functionality. The functionality is ex-
tensive in part because the application generates medical reports of the patients, so most 
of the reports are medical. The purely medical report is ill-fitted for sending to the data 
subjects because it may contain incomplete diagnosis data which could be misinterpreted 
by the data subject. That is why the developers of the application do not want to show the 
existing medical report to patients. 
In addition to the medical report, the application does have the ability to generate an audit 
log report on a patient. The application collects data about what actions each user has 
made on which parts of the application and an extensive audit trail is formed from the 
tracked audit data. The audit log report collects information regarding one patient about 
who accessed or modified the patient’s information, what the action was and when was it 
made. The report is highly detailed and maybe too detailed for a non-expert user of the 
application to get useful information out of it. The Finnish Act on the Electronic Pro-
cessing of Client Data in Healthcare also details that potentially harmful log information 
should not be shown to the patients [18]. The application does have several reports, but a 
properly fitting report template for the GDPR’s data subject's rights does not exist. The 
data subject’s right to request information stored of them cannot be fulfilled currently.  
Regarding functional suitability sub-characteristics, functional completeness is rated 
three, since while there exists a functionality to generate reports in a widely used format, 
none of the report templates contains all the information needed. Amending the situation 
should not demand much work however since all that is needed is a new report template. 
Functional correctness is rated two since currently, the functionality does not provide 
principally correct results regarding the GDPR requirements. The information on each 
separate report is not correct as the required precision is that the report should have patient 
personal data and condensed audit data concerning their files. The functional appropri-
ateness is rated four since the application has perfectly appropriate functionality for this 
requirement. 
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The right to rectification can be currently fulfilled within the application. This right has 
more to do with providing the ability for the patient to make the request and that the 
changes are then made to the personal data of that patient. Since the appropriate user can 
make changes to the personal data of a patient and these changes leave logs, the functional 
sub-characteristics of this requirements can all be rated four.  
Currently, there is no way to delete a patient from the application or its database. Not 
being able to delete patient information is understandable since legislation can require the 
storage of patient data up to several years and because there might not be a need to make 
more room to a database if an entry is not needed or erroneous. Deletion functionality is 
also risky since it is possible to erase data that is required by law to store. Although the 
GDPR does present several exceptions as to when the right of erasure is not applicable, 
there might be situations, where this functionality is needed as was discussed in the pre-
vious chapter. If done right, the functionality will not interfere with the routine use of the 
application, and there is no harm in preparing for a sudden need rather than leave the right 
out and suddenly need it. Since the GDPR does not require this right to be fulfilled in this 
application’s case, the right is left out of the analysis 
Right to the restriction of processing can be handled with a feature called on-hold that is 
already a feature of the application. This feature effectively excludes a specific patient 
from the operations that the users of the application can perform until the patient is taken 
out from hold. The user that puts a patient on-hold needs to give a reason for the action 
and that given reason is also saved so that other users know why the patient is excluded. 
Putting a patient on-hold is immediate and not tasking to undo. As such the software 
already has the means to comply with this data subject right. Then again, the feature is 
not originally designed to be used for this purpose which might present some complica-
tions.  
Regarding the sub-characteristics, functional completeness is graded two, since while the 
on-hold function itself is ready, it is not initially designed for this use. As that function is 
used for other tasks as well, there needs to be some way of segregating between patients 
that are on hold because they have exercised their right or because of another reason. The 
user can specify the reason for putting the patient on-hold, put a clear representation 
should be ensured. For correctness, the application is graded two. Appropriateness is 
graded three since the functionality is appropriate although not initially designed for this 
use, so some modifications are needed. 
It is possible to export patient’s data from the application into a machine-readable format, 
for example in a comma-separated values (CSV) format, to move the information from 
the system to another. The export feature could be used for archival purposes too if the 
archive is another dedicated system. Although the GDPR’s wording does not strictly re-
quire the compliance to the right to data portability in this application’s case, the right 
could be fulfilled if needed. Part of the information gathering is based on consent, so in 
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that sense, this right could be applicable. The data would probably not be sent to the data 
subject, but directly to another system. As the GDPR does not explicitly require this right 
in the case of the analysed application, it is left out of the analysis. 
Right to object based on the regulation’s specification could also be handled with the on-
hold-feature. The necessity of complying with the right to object in this case is unclear. 
Even if complying is necessary, the data processor can provide a compelling reason why 
the processing needs to continue. In the application, the reason is health-related data. Still, 
if this right is analysed here, the on-hold feature would probably not be the best option. 
Since the regulation does not mention anything about reversing the right to object, then 
if the on-hold feature is used, the patient is permanently on-hold. This distinction would 
be required to show to the users, so they do not accidentally take the patient out of on-
hold. Functional completeness is therefore rated two, correctness two and appropriateness 
two. These grades mirror right to restriction on some level, but the existing functionality 
is less appropriate in this case. 
The access control of the application divides users into roles with the possibility of allo-
cating each role with different rights and assign users to these roles, so not all functional-
ity is available to all users. The least privilege concept can then be used correctly. Au-
thentication is also robust with measures to authenticate the user and locking the applica-
tion when it has not been used in a while. Log traces are also generated upon entries and 
for example when a user accesses a patient’s file. This way unauthorised accesses still 
leave a trace behind. 
Andress [1, p. 78] mentioned that data in use is difficult to protect since a user can do 
several different things with the data. Also, as was mentioned in Chapter 3, some devices 
can leak sensitive data from memory, and attacks such as buffer overflows can force leak-
ages to happen. Securing data in use puts much responsibility to the user as they can break 
the confidentiality, integrity, availability and authenticity of the data. One mitigating fac-
tor the application has are the audit logs, so modifications at least do not go unnoticed. 
Because the responsibility rests on the user, one way the application can control this is 
the mentioned access control level. Not giving everyone the same rights enhances the 
CIA and authenticity attributes. Logically another way to increase data in use protection 
would be device full disk encryption since it would encrypt the data currently stored on 
the user’s computer. Full disk encryption of the users' devices is outside the bounds of 
this approach since the sites would implement this. The risk for an attack against the 
users’ computers physically in a closed and guarded environment is not as likely as some 
more mundane ways of breaking information security. 
Buffer overflows or similar types of means to try and acquire information from the appli-
cation during use is another vector but by themselves worthy of a wholly separate analysis 
since there are a substantial amount of ways to conduct this type of attack and how to 
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protect against it. OWASP [35] mentions that the .NET platform is not particularly af-
fected by buffer overflows, so the framework of choice also mitigates the risk of over-
flows. When the protection level of data in use is evaluated, the primary means of evalu-
ation is access control. Since it is robust the grade for all functional suitability character-
istics is four.  
Not being in a publicly accessible network might make the network more secure, but an 
internal network is not threat free. An organisation can quickly focus on external threats 
and forget about internal threats, even though the internal threats could be as common as 
external ones [24]. As Kemp [24] notes, it is far easier to sniff web traffic if that individual 
already has access to the infrastructure because they work in the said organisation. That 
is why the internal network and its potential risks need to be considered and not take the 
perceived security for granted. A DMZ creates a buffer area where external networks can 
connect to and makes unauthorised intrusion to a network harder. DMZ-type of protec-
tions are useful, but they are not by themselves enough in securing an internal network 
[54, p. 337]. DMZ is also not by itself enough when data protection is the aim since the 
DMZ does not consider itself with what information contains if it is deemed safe. Confi-
dentiality can be broken even with DMZ in place. Limited remote operating functionali-
ties are also present, and users can perform limited tasks while connecting from another 
network. Andress [1, p. 77] mentions VPN’s as a possible solution too when a private 
connection is wanted.  
Even considering the caveats, the internal network provides a high level of safety. The 
connection from the client computers to the web-servers can be made via Hyper-Text 
Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) encrypting the connection between the web-server 
and the client computers. HTTPS supports the protection of the data in transit, at least 
between those two points. As the application works in an internal network, the security 
certificates are self-signed which is adequate in this case. 
The connection between the web-server and the database server is not encrypted, so the 
data is sent in the clear. As the data is sent unprotected the data in transit protections are 
not wholly complete. That means that the confidentiality and integrity of the information 
cannot wholly be ensured. Authenticity is also questionable if the messages can be 
changed while transmitting. That is why the functional completeness grade is two since 
data is only partially delivered encrypted. Functional correctness is therefore also graded 
two. Functional appropriateness is graded three since as the only missing functionality is 
an encrypted connection between the database and the web server. This functionality is 
already included in the .NET framework and SQL Server [31], so the functionality itself 
exists but just not used currently. 
The database uses pseudonymisation of data widely, and the patients are identified based 
on pseudonym in most instances. There is only one table that links the pseudonym to the 
actual person. The database access control is handled on a user credential basis although 
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the database itself is not encrypted on disk. As was discussed in Chapter 3 concerning 
data protection at rest, physical access limitation and encryption are fitting means of se-
curing data that at rest. While accounting for physical barriers to users’ computers is not 
possible in this thesis since that falls under the responsibility of the sites themselves, ac-
cess control limits the ability to use the application. Since the application does not stay 
open during extended times of inactivity, it limits the unauthorised accesses.  
Andress [1, p. 75] mentions that encrypting the device disk also protect data at rest. En-
crypting the discs means that if someone would try and access the data directly from the 
disk, they would only see encrypted data. The availability of the data needs to be ensured, 
so the encryption must not interfere too much with the everyday use of the application. 
As for the grading, functional completeness is measured as two since there is working to 
be done if complete protection is desired. Same goes for the functional correctness. As 
for the appropriateness, data at rest protection is graded three since the protections in 
place are for the most part appropriate. 
The results of the analysis of the application’s current state are presented in Table 4. All 
in all, the state of the application is decent with a fair amount of protections already in 
place. The total grade is calculated with the generalised mean presented in Equation 1. 
and is presented for each requirement separately as well as the overall total grade for the 
whole application including all the requirements. The overall total grade for the applica-
tion is 2,49. 
Table 4. Results regarding the current state of the application and the GDPR 
The GDPR’s re-
quirement 
Functional com-
pleteness 
Functional 
correctness 
Functional ap-
propriateness 
Total grade 
Right to access 
data 
3 2 4 2,66 
Right to rectifica-
tion 
4 4 4 4 
Right to a re-
striction of pro-
cessing 
2 2 3 2,22 
Right to object 2 2 2 2 
Data protected in 
use 
4 4 4 4 
Data protected in 
transit 
2 2 3 2,22 
Data protected at 
rest 
2 2 3 2,22 
Total grade 2,38 2,26 3.01 2,49 
 
As can be seen from the resulting score, the application is not entirely in line with the 
requirements. Nevertheless, the score can be called satisfactory since the generalised 
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mean drags the score downward rather than upward. For example, if the internal network 
were to be considered perfectly secure, the grade would be much closer to three. The 
grade describes the application's current state well and considers how easy or hard the 
modifications presumably are. 
The right to request correction, data portability and data protected in use are the only 
requirements entirely fulfilled from the start, and there is no need for changes related to 
them. All the other functionality requires work though and ideas for the improvement. 
The functional appropriateness score of 3.01 is the highest of sub-characteristic grades 
which indicates that the application contains sufficiently proper functionality and that 
several changes can be made relatively quickly. The .NET framework affects this in part 
since it supports the easy addition of several functionalities.  
Functional completeness and correctness did not fare as well as appropriateness. This 
difference shows that while the functionality in place or offered is appropriate, it is not 
complete and does not provide correct results in many instances. These gaps call for sev-
eral improvements to be made. On the other hand, it might be better for the application 
that the results are the way they are. Since the functionality is mostly appropriate the only 
work that needs to be done is to fill the gaps and complete the functionality to be on the 
desired level.  
The requirements grades are more in uniform, mostly because the right to rectification 
and data protection in use requirements are already fulfilled sufficiently. Three require-
ments have the same grading which again mirrors how the appropriateness is there but 
that the functionality is not wholly complete and correct. Right to access data is the high-
est graded requirement if the full graded ones are disregarded. As the reporting function-
ality is appropriate and suitable and most advanced regarding the requirements presented 
by the GDPR, the grade is fitting.  
 Proposed changes 
Even though the present state of the application is good considering the GDPR’s require-
ments, there are evident changes that should be made. The required changes have mostly 
to do with the GDPR’s data subject rights, but some information security related func-
tionality should be enhanced too. 
As the application is missing the functionality to fulfil the GDPR’s right for the patient 
to access their data that is stored, a new report template needs to be generated. Fortu-
nately, the previously generated reports have been PDF’s which fulfils the widely used 
format requirement, so the only task is to design the template. The template should in-
clude the patient’s personal information and additionally collated data about their diag-
nosis data. Also, aggregated audit trail data concerning that data subject should also be 
included. Even though the GDPR does not explicitly require the inclusion of audit data, 
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it would not be surprising if the requirement stays at least in the Finnish legislation, as it 
was there previously. The audit trail information should include who had accessed the 
data subject’s information, why it was accessed and when it was accessed.  
As the previous reports have been available in a drop-down menu in a toolbar located on 
view where the specific patient’s record is open, the new report will be a new item on the 
drop-down. That way it does not majorly affect the functionality of the application, and 
the user right requirement is satisfied. 
The right of erasure requires a whole new feature for the application. The user of the 
application should not just be able to look up the patient and delete the whole record. The 
option for deletion should only be visible to user groups that have higher privileges and 
should not be functional remotely. Another possibility is that only the user who has a 
patient-doctor relationship can see and interact with the button.  
For the functionality, one possible solution is a button on the patient viewscreen, in the 
main toolbar. Upon pressing the button, a new dialogue screen is opened, and the user is 
asked to confirm their intention by writing into the dialogue some piece of information 
of the patient, such as their individualising ID, which is their pseudonym used throughout 
the system. By inserting the correct information and then closing the dialogue, the patient 
would be moved into a deleted state. The patients who are in a deleted state could be 
collated into the same section of a view for example, and they would be searchable. Then 
in a required timeframe, another user could review the patients to be deleted and perma-
nently make the deletion decision. This way the deletion has a minute change of being 
accidental and even considers a malicious insider. Naturally, a backend functionality must 
be developed so that the specific rows are removed concerning the deleted patient in the 
database. 
The problem is the audit logs. These logs likely contain some mention of the erased data 
subject’s data since a trace must be formed if these are changed. So, if the data subject’s 
data is to be erased, then these log entries should also be removed. However, the problem 
is that these log files are essential and needed at least in the eyes of the legislature pre-
ceding the GDPR [18]. The GDPR does overwrite these acts, but there is no reason to 
think that the member states such as Finland would not introduce these measures back 
into the legislation. The patient’s pseudonym is a good candidate for the logs, but then 
the question remains that how can the pseudonym be linked back to the data subject when 
the linking information has been deleted?  The requirement of storing the logs means that 
the information erasure can never be complete and questions the need for such function-
ality existing altogether.  
As was argued before there is a strong reason why this kind of functionality is useful, but 
it must be noted that the erasure functionality in the analysed application’s case cannot 
be wholly used. As the GDPR does not require this functionality for this application’s 
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context, the decision is left to the company developing this application. The potential 
problems presented here must be one of the reasons for the right of erasure’s several ex-
ceptions. Then again, this contradiction can reveal a larger question from within the reg-
ulation on how the right of erasure can co-exist with other rights in the regulation and 
how can the erasing be done in information security considering way. 
The right of restriction and the right to object can be handled with the on-hold-feature. 
However, as the feature was not initially used for this purpose, some modifications should 
be planned. The feature made it possible to write a reason why the patient was put on-
hold that is displayed alongside the record. The patients that have exercised their right 
can be marked so by writing the reason to a note related to the record that was put on 
hold. As was mentioned in the present state of the application section, the patients put on 
hold due to the GDPR should be differentiated somehow so that other users do not acci-
dentally add them back into the use in the application.  
In the right to object requirement’s context, the on-hold functionality needs to accurately 
differentiate the patients also between those who have exercised the right of restriction 
and right to object. The right to object is more permanent than the right of restriction since 
there is no mention in the GDPR of allowing processing of the data after the right has 
been exercised. The right to object can be countered with compelling legitimate grounds, 
and since this right could be considered harmful to the patient if exercised, then such a 
legitimate reason could be formed, and this right disregarded. However, as the GDPR 
remains vague regarding the exceptional cases and the compelling reason, it might be the 
best not to disregard the right to object outright.  
Data in use protection improvements are difficult to assess considering the technical 
changes to the application. As was mentioned in the previous section, the protection of 
data in use is so dependent on the users of the application that small technical solutions 
are not enough. As the application logs actions taken extensively and a trace is left of the 
user’s action so if something goes wrong, the culprit can at least be found.  
Currently, even though the connection via HTTPS from the client to the web-server is a 
possibility and adequate level of security through encryption is implemented in the soft-
ware system, the connection from said web-server to the database is unencrypted. This 
means that it is possible for an eavesdropper to listen on the connections from the web-
server to the database. The situation can be improved with a TLS-connection (Transport 
Layer Security) that should with proper encryption algorithm give adequate protection 
for the database connections. .NET-framework supports this functionality natively, so this 
change does not require any significant functional changes in the application [31]. 
As for the data at rest, SQL Server provides suitable features. Microsoft’s SQL server has 
a built-in feature called Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) which encrypts and decrypts 
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the database, backups and transaction log files in real time. It should not cause any prob-
lems with the application itself, so it can be turned on without requiring any changes. 
TDE does not directly encrypt the data tables, so if the user has permissions, they can see 
the whole database unencrypted. Instead, TDE protects the physical data files and log 
files so that if they would be moved to another location, the files are encrypted and cannot 
be used. [32]  
As TDE is a relatively lightweight to take into use, it would increase the data at rest pro-
tection level with relative ease. It works with older SQL Server versions and the free 
Community version too, so compatibility issues should not be an issue even if a site has 
an older version of SQL Server installed. It would prevent someone from directly access-
ing the database files on the server machine but would not interfere with legitimate con-
nections coming from the application, therefore increasing the confidentiality and integ-
rity of the stored personal data. Whether a malicious individual deliberately going to the 
database server and removing storage devices and then trying to extract data from them 
is considered likely depends mainly on the site where this application is located, but with 
the TDE such a possibility can be eliminated with relatively small changes to the appli-
cation architecture. 
Another solution Microsoft offers is Always Encrypted that is designed for highly sensi-
tive data which does apply to the application in question. Always Encrypted feature is 
much more complex and robust than TDE. In Always Encrypted a driver is installed to 
client computers, and that driver determines from previously configured settings which 
information is to encrypt and what is not and then sends those columns encrypted to the 
server, which then decrypts the encrypted data. [33] Always Encrypted requires a newer 
version of the SQL Server and is likely too complicated solution regarding the analysed 
application. It potentially requires structural changes to database tables and additional 
setup. As the internal network the application is in offers a fair amount of protection, 
Always Encrypted seems to be excessive.  
 The result of the analysis 
The overall suitableness of the analysed application regarding the GDPR is satisfactory, 
and the changes required for the application can be considered modest. Several of the 
functionalities the application already had before the GDPR could be repurposed quite 
easily to fit the requirements derived from the GDPR. The presented change proposals 
contain room for deciding the best approach which means that every proposed change is 
not mandatory.  
Every software application is unique and differs in the amount of work needed to make 
the application and organisation compatible with the new regulation. Medical applica-
tions may have an advantage over regular consumer applications and services since med-
ical applications have exemptions in the regulation and the usage of professional medical 
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applications is different to consumer applications. Based on the analysis, the GDPR af-
fects the privacy landscape on a grander scale than mere feature implementations. Feature 
implementations are still needed so that the applications would be GDPR compliant but 
are not what the regulation emphasises.  
Related to the national level data protection laws discussed in Chapter 5, the GDPR brings 
new requirements for the data controllers and software systems, although the most 
apparent new requirements, the right of erasure or data portability, are not applicable in 
the analysed application’s case. Most of the GDPR’s requirements cannot be summarised 
into a short presentable notion since they are foundational. Still, among the requirements 
of the GDPR, there is an evident number of previously established ones. Personal data 
considering health is still deemed to be of high risk by default, and the applications must 
be designed mirror that risk level. With the proposed changes, the analysed application 
fulfils the requirements presented by the wording of the GDPR and the best estimate that 
can be given at the time of writing this thesis.  
What the GDPR seems to mean for the data controllers handling health data is that the 
controllers need to think more about what personal data they collect, how they process it 
and how to handle the lifecycle protection of the personal data. Organisations need to 
consider the risks that may be directed to the data that they process, and the risk analysis 
should include the data itself and not merely the means of protecting it. This is especially 
real when operating under the explicit consent given by the data subject as that consent 
can be revoked. 
Considering the health care industry, the GDPR does not bring any significant changes 
with it that would affect the industry specifically. The organisations need to be more care-
ful than those entities that process data that has a smaller risk level, but that was the case 
before the GDPR. The regulation has included health care specific rules and exclusions 
to the rights the data subjects have so that entities that have legal requirements based on 
them from other national and broader levels of legislations can exempt themselves from 
fulfilling the rights. An example of this is the right of erasure that was also shown to be 
in contradiction with the requirement of storing log files even if somehow it was applica-
ble in health care scope.  
The security rules presented by the regulation are not by themselves new, but the level 
the GDPR attempts to apply the rules is. The data controllers need to think more about 
the ways to increase their information security level as the GDPR instructs in Article 32 
such as data minimisation and using pseudonyms [13]. With these new requirements, the 
information security level also increases when the contents of the data itself are 
considered on an equal level with the improvements made to technical solutions like en-
cryption or access control. 
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8. DISCUSSION 
Based on the analysis of one medical software application, the GDPR does not offer an-
ything ground-breaking regarding strict requirements. The medical software may not be 
the best to estimate the overall impact of the regulation since medical records have been 
thought of as sensitive data even before the GDPR. As such the GDPR’s more substantial 
impact is likely is consumer software applications and services that may not have had 
such extensive functionality and operate on the public internet. The GDPR does seem to 
extend the idea of risk management into broader business activity, where data controllers 
and processors must think about why what and how they process data subjects’ data. 
The analysed application was already in use with several years of development behind it. 
The GDPR’s idea of “data protection by design and data protection by default” is not 
realised since redesigning a whole application from the ground up is not feasible. How-
ever, this applies to every application developed before the GDPR came into effect, with 
varying results. Of course, the thinking model presented by the “data protection by design 
and data protection by default” can be integrated into new features that are added to the 
existing systems.  
It can be argued that it is difficult to draw any universal conclusions from one applica-
tion's scope. Then again as the regulation is so new, this same approach can be used to 
analyse other applications as well. Also considering medical software applications the 
points presented in this thesis may help when thinking about which parts of the GDPR 
are relevant to them and how to ensure a suitable information security level in the appli-
cation. 
Some aspects, especially regarding the user rights presented in the GDPR, were brought 
upon and analysed here that were not necessarily mandatory if the text of the regulation 
was to be interpreted concretely. Such is, for example, the right to object. As the personal 
data contained in the application analysed is medical but at the same time collected partly 
through the explicit consent of the patient the data controller must think about whether 
the right applies and how to justify that decision to those entities that ask about it.  
Koops and Leenes [25] mentioned that purely technical solutions should not be the only 
solutions when thinking about GDPR compliance. Not relying entirely on technical 
solutions makes the compliance with the GDPR complicated from the data controller’s 
perspective since organisational measures such as training should be planned and exe-
cuted alongside the required technical solutions. The possible complications can be 
thought of as a good thing and likely is what the makers of the regulation intended. While 
the technical aspects of the application were analysed, and their states quantified, there is 
still a gap considering how the sites using the application conform to GDPR.  
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 Limitations and future research 
The newness factor of the GDPR is an obvious limitation to this thesis since legal prece-
dents are bound to start taking shape, and the emphases of the GDPR will become more 
apparent and the regulation more straightforward to implement. That is part speculation 
and part hopefulness, but since the spirit of the law may sometimes differ from the de-
tailed text, the best practices related to the regulation are likely to mould soon. Then less 
speculative analyses can be completed, and more concrete results derived from them. 
The laws in this thesis were almost purely analysed based on the official texts. Laws 
usually have interpretations and precedents that are used when the laws are enforced. The 
absence of these interpretations is an obvious limitation of this thesis as the analysis could 
have been more thorough if the ways of interpretation were also analysed. The approach 
of this thesis still has merit though since the precedents of the GDPR have not yet been 
formed so legal texts are compared on the same level when only the texts themselves are 
analysed. 
Another limitation is the almost purely technical viewpoint since the human factor of the 
sites cannot be accounted for. However, many companies face the dilemma of making 
the product they sell as good as possible considering data protection and do not have 
much knowledge of the specific environments where their customers use the software 
they have developed. There is a separation of concerns where both parties must think 
about which solutions fit them the best. For those integrating new software into their 
broader network of systems, a guarantee from the developers of the application that the 
application conforms fully with the GDPR might be an advantage on the competitive 
market in the future. 
In the future, the analysis method of this thesis could be refined more. The ISO/IEC 25010 
standard provides with the power mean a suitable basis for numerical analysis of the ap-
plication’s current state related to the requirements. The requirements derived from the 
GDPR could be further refined and multiplied so all the needed aspects of the regulation 
could be analysed. In this thesis, the needed requirements were not significant in numbers 
since the analysis considered a developing company and their application. An analysis of 
an implementation of the GDPR in one of the sites using an application like the one ana-
lysed in this thesis would surely be beneficial. 
As the GDPR becomes the norm and first legal cases are resolved the actual impact of the 
regulation will become more evident. Same applies for member state legislations as they 
get refined and introduce member state relevant measures into the legislation alongside 
the measures of the GDPR. As future research, it would be interesting to see how the 
GDPR is enforced. The study of the enforcement is to see how the regulation has changed 
the way companies think about privacy or whether the GDPR has changed anything. One 
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development that is also interesting is how the regulation changes the legislations of non-
EU countries. 
It would be fascinating to study what kinds of organisational measures are developed to 
improve the overall data protection level in companies and other institutions. A study 
where the gaps left by this thesis would be analysed, such as data in use protections or 
how the data subject communication with the data controller would be standardised would 
benefit many other organisations. 
 Analysis of the proposed changes to the application 
The changes required to the application are relatively small. The result is, of course, good 
news since the advent of the GDPR does not cause any significant financial requirements 
from the company developing this application. 
The proposed changes raise the rating of the application towards the maximum number 
four, but a new analysis would be needed after these changes are reviewed an imple-
mented to find out a new grade. All the user rights are considered however which means 
that the aim of the regulation is reached. As was mentioned before, not all the rights are 
necessarily applicable regarding healthcare applications  
A question related to the more information security-oriented change proposals is that how 
secure an internal network can be deemed to be? Even with a high level of risk, an internal 
network provides a level of protection from outside threats. So, are the detailed encryption 
proposals necessary in the case of an internal network? The answer is not unequivocal 
because a private network can be thought to increase data protection level by itself so 
much that encrypted connections are unnecessary. Then again, the changes required for 
the implementation of wholly encrypted connections and encryption of data at rest is rel-
atively easy and with that small commitment increase the confidentiality and integrity of 
personal data and other data contained in the application by a significant amount. Encryp-
tion is also mentioned as a security-enhancing method several times in the literature, so 
it should not be forgotten purely because of an internal network set-up. 
The implementation of more encrypted connections does bring with itself the need for a 
strategy concerning encryption keys and certificates. As the HTTPS connection was 
already implemented in the application, some strategies have already had to be formed. 
This means that the management strategy should not have to be made up from scratch and 
the older guidelines could be modified to use. TDE’s key management is straightforward 
according to Microsoft since the key is stored in the database boot record [32].  
Considering the application with the proposed improvements included, it is fitting to an-
alyse it regarding the ISO/IEC 25010 standard’s [46] security sub-characteristics with 
availability included from the reliability characteristic. The proposed changes include 
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room for further analysis and there is a possibility that even though some changes would 
seem to improve the security level, a direct opposite may happen, or some other aspect of 
the application may be worsened.  
Van der Haak et al. [22] mention secure connections and authorisation concepts for en-
suring confidentiality. As the proposed connections and the database are encrypted, and 
access control measures are in place, the confidentiality of the information the application 
contains is guaranteed to be better than before. Although van der Haak et al. [22] discuss 
cross-institutional electronic patient records in their study, this scope is not much differ-
ent. 
Encryption also helps with ensuring information integrity and authenticity. As the used 
protocol for transmitting the data from the web-server to the database is SSL/TLS, a mes-
sage digest is calculated ensuring integrity if a proper hashing algorithm is used. Authen-
ticity is improved because the message is unlikely to change while the information is 
transmitted, and the information is as the user intended it to be. Access control also helps 
with increasing the level of authenticity. 
Accountability and non-repudiation were in good shape already in the application as the 
audit logs and trail was extensive. These changes do not affect the state of these sub-
characteristics. Availability should also not be affected, and TDE should not change the 
functionality of the application or make data unavailable for legitimate users. Availability 
is also affected by measures like backups and resilient systems which are out of the scope 
of this thesis. 
Internal networks and encryption are not automatically compatible. Since the network is 
internal, the appropriate question is that are the presented encryption solutions necessary. 
Fauri et al. [16], while discussing internal networks in industrial control systems, analyse 
the benefits of adding encryption to a network already protected from the public. Fauri et 
al. conclude that encryption does not automatically yield extra security, that encryption 
can, in fact, have negative consequences for security and that encryption can increase 
maintenance costs. Although industrial control systems are a completely different field 
than the analysed medical application, they share the commonality of an internal network 
and that they are both information systems.  
Many attacks target the end points of the connections, and in those cases, encryption does 
not help increase security. As Fauri et al. [16] and van der Haak [22] mention encryption 
helps ensure confidentiality on the wire. On the other hand, if the potential attack or other 
defect is directed at the end points, the confidentiality on the wire does not matter as the 
messages can be decrypted by using the encryption keys on the endpoints [16].  
Encryption might present threats to security and hinder the functionality of solutions. 
Fauri et al. [16] mention that while encryption obfuscates the data from potential attack-
ers, it also obfuscates it from legitimate tools that monitor the network. These tools might 
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without the encryption notice irregularities in the network traffic and be more effective in 
finding issues. The last reason for doubts considering encryption, Fauri et al. argue that 
encryption could increase the cost and complexity of troubleshooting and recovery. 
Sometimes the best way to check, for example, congestion related issues is to check pack-
age contents, which would not be possible if the packages were encrypted. This issue 
might be more relevant in the industrial control system space, but it is something that 
should be considered. 
Fauri et al. [16] do not discard encryption in internal networks entirely but merely want 
to remind that it is not a silver bullet. In the analysed application, encryption should not 
be a silver bullet either. Considering the relative easiness of adopting an encrypted con-
nection in the application, adopting a secured connection to the database is still recom-
mended based on the analysis conducted in this thesis. The need for encryption might be 
a relevant issue to discuss with the sites using the analysed application as the means of 
monitoring network traffic probably differ between sites, and some sites might want to 
sacrifice encryption to monitor the network more effectively. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis attempted to analyse the in parts open-ended nature of the GDPR to give more 
concrete examples on how the regulation would affect software applications that contain 
data concerning health. The analysed application was deemed to be in a satisfactory state 
considering the requirements derived from the GDPR, although improvements are needed 
to comply with the regulation. 
Through the analysis of a medical software application in this thesis, it has been shown 
that while the General Data Protection Regulation contains novel concepts that will 
undoubtedly improve data subjects’ privacy, its impact on medical applications cannot be 
considered extensive. Although the amount of work needed to be on an acceptable level 
of data protection and information security depends on the application, it can be said that 
if best practices and guidelines have been followed during development, then the regula-
tion should not present a significant need for changes. 
The GDPR compares itself well to the national legislations that preceded it. In several 
sections, the regulation is more detailed even though there are not any single huge 
changes. The GDPR extends the idea of risk management into the contents of the personal 
data that entities store and process, so that companies must think about why they store 
data and what risks might be directed to the data. The means detailed by the GDPR such 
as data minimisation are needed to mitigate the risks. Other, more technical measures are 
also needed, but they are not the only answer to the threats targeted at personal data. 
Most of the data subject rights presented by the GDPR have already been detailed in 
previous legislations in Europe and outside of it. On the rights, like the right of erasure, 
the regulation details many exceptions and ways for the data controllers to deny the re-
quests made by data subjects. Medical applications are given freedoms in these excep-
tions as the other legal requirements weigh heavily on balance.  
While the impact of the GDPR might not be extensive on the medical field, it will 
undoubtedly still improve the data protection of the patients. The unifying element of the 
regulation will likely help in brining all the member states’ information security and data 
protection legislations closer to one another. Open questions remain on how the regula-
tion will be enforced in practice and how the data subject rights end up affecting different 
fields.  
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